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NOTE
THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT: ANOTHER
EXTRATERRITORIAL ACT THAT WON'T
WORK
I. INTRODUCTION
The Cuban Democracy Act, passed by Congress and signed
by President George Bush in October 1992, is designed to
tighten the trade embargo against Fidel Castro's government
in order to force political and economic reform in Cuba. The
explicit purpose of the Act is to "promote a peaceful transition
[to democracy] in Cuba"' and to end Cuba's thirty-plus-year
history with communism. The Cuban Democracy Act continues
the longstanding United States policy of forbidding domestic
trade with Cuba.2 In addition, the Act now forbids American-
owned or controlled firms incorporated in other countries from
trading with the island country.3 The passage of the Act has
engendered many protests by those nations that are home to
the firms affected by the Act. Those nations' officials are an-
gered and concerned that the United States is interfering in
their sovereign affairs by attempting to control the actions of
businesses incorporated outside of the United States, although
owned or controlled by United States nationals.4
This Note examines the Cuban Democracy Act from the
perspective of both United States law and international law in
order to show how the extraterritorial nature of the Cuban
1. 22 U.S.C. § 6001(8) (Supp. IV 1988). For a full discussion of the Act, see
infra Part II.
2. 22 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (Supp. IV 1988).
3. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
4. See infra part W.B.1.
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Democracy Act, like other United States trade embargoes,
cannot be justified by principles of international law because it
unjustifiably interferes with the sovereignty of other nations.
Part II examines the Cuban Democracy Act, its legal bases,
goals, and enforcement procedures. Part III addresses the legal
principles that underlie the dispute concerning the Cuban
Democracy Act. It first examines the nature of subsidiaries
incorporated abroad and then examines the internationally
accepted principles of jurisdiction and highlights the differenc-
es between the international perspective on jurisdiction and
that of the United States. Part IV examines the problems that
have or should ensue, given the lack of jurisdiction, when the
United States attempts to enforce the Cuban Democracy Act.
These problems include harming diplomatic relations, causing
international legal responses that blunt the effect of the Cuban
Democracy Act, and creating difficult legal situations for Amer-
ican-owned, foreign-based subsidiaries. Part V offers some sug-
gestions for amending the Cuban Democracy Act and offers
some thoughts for congressional action. This Note concludes
that the Cuban Democracy Act is an unwarranted extraterrito-
rial act, hurting United States diplomatic and long-term trade
interests, as well as international friendships. This Note sug-
gests that it is in the best interests of the United States to
work more closely with other countries and with bodies such as
the United Nations in order to effect peaceful change, rather
than act in a unilateral extraterritorial fashion as it did in this
instance.
II. THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT OF 1992
A. The Laws Affecting Trade with Cuba Prior to the Passage of
the Cuban Democracy Act
1. Historical Background
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 is the most recent of
many actions taken by the United States government against
Cuba since Cuba's revolution in 1959 and the creation of its
communist government.5 In 1961 the United States attempted
5. Even before the Communist takeover, the United States had been closely
involved in Cuban life. When Cuba won its independence from Spain in 1899,
Cuba was under the military occupation of the United States. In 1901 it was
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to incite the toppling of the Castro government through a
failed military invasion by Cuban exiles known as the Bay of
Pigs.' The next year, the United States forced the Soviet Un-
ion to halt and dismantle its missiles installed in Cuba that
threatened the security of this country! Also in 1962, import
and export controls were instituted under the authority of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.8 In 1963 Congress enacted a
comprehensive set of regulations, the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations (CACRs)9 to control American involvement with
Cuba.
2. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations
The CACRs were designed to control closely the conduct of
individuals and businesses wishing to have any dealings with
Cuba." The CACRs prohibit almost all commercial, financial,
forced to approve a constitutional amendment (the Platt Amendment) that gave
the United States the right to monopolize the economy, intervene in domestic
political affairs, and approve international treaties. An indefinite lease was also
granted to the United States to what has become the Guantanamo Bay military
station. The Platt Amendment remained in force until 1934, but America's control
continued to remain a key factor in Cuba's political life. Thus, from its first days,
the Cuban Republic was dominated by the on-site, pervasive American presence
until the revolution of 1959 which brought President Fidel Castro and the Commu-
nists to power. Franklin W. Knight, Cuba, in THE MODERN CARIBBEAN 169, 170-71
(Franklin W. Knight & Colin A. Palmer eds., 1989).
6. CARIBBEAN 1993 BuSINEss DIRECTORY: INTERNATIONAL EDITION 79 (1993);
see also Anthony P. Maingot, Caribbean International Relations, in THE MODERN
CARIBBEAN, supra note 5, at 259, 267.
7. See Proclamation No. 3504, 3 C.F.R. 232 (1959-1963), reprinted in
50 U.S.CA. app. at 13-14 (West 1990) and in 77 Stat. 958 (1962); Proclamation
No. 3507, 3 C.F.R. 236 (1959-1963), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. app. at 14 (West
1990) and in 77 Stat. 961 (1962).
8. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1982). The initial controls were instituted in 1962
and read, in part, "No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to the
present government of Cuba . . . . [Tihe President is authorized to establish and
maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba." Id.
These controls had a tremendous impact on Cuban trade. In 1985 there was more
than one billion dollars worth of trade; in the first half of 1962, trade was only
$373,000, all of which was exports from the United States. A.L.C. DE MESTRAL &
T. GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF EXPORT CONTROL
LEGISLATION: CANADA AND THE U.S.A. 212 (1990) (citing DEPVT ST. BULL., Oct.
1962, at 591, 592).
9. The United States instituted the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
(CACRs) on July 9, 1963. 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1993). The CACRs are administered by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury. Id.
10. The CACRs were issued under the authority of § 5(b) of the Trading With
the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA). For the text of TWEA, see 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-
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or trade transactions, either direct or indirect, with Cuba by
persons within the United States." The CACRs have re-
mained in force since 1963, with several revisions, including
those generated by the passage of the Cuban Democracy
Act. 12
The CACRs regulate trade" with Cuba 4 by demanding
44 (1988). The TWEA allows the president to prohibit trade between the United
States and other states deemed to be enemies of the United States. Between 1933
and 1977, the TWEA allowed the president to invoke special measures, including
trade embargoes, both during times of war and under a declared national emer-
gency. In 1977 the TWEA was modified so that the president can now institute an
embargo using the powers of the TWEA only during wartime. Although a new act,
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1706 (1988), was drafted to supplement the now restricted powers of the TWEA,
the Cuban regulations and other existing economic sanctions programs were
grandfathered by Title I of Pub. L. No. 95-223 (1977) which stated that presiden-
tial authority exercised over a country prior to July 1, 1977, as a result of a pres-
identially declared national emergency may continue to be exercised with respect
to such country. For the language of the grandfather clause, see 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§ 5 (West 1990), historical and statutory notes. For a brief history of the TWEA
and the CACRs, see Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 226-27 & nn.1-4 (1984).
11. The exceptions to the prohibitions, all of which are limited, have been in
the areas of travel, 31 C.F.R. § 515.415 (1993), family remittances, 31 C.F.R. §
515.521-.522 (1993), the importing and exporting of publications and informational
materials, 31 C.F.R. § 515.206 (1993), and foreign subsidiary trade, 31 C.F.R. §
515.559 (1992). This latter exception was eliminated in 1992 by the Cuban Democ-
racy Act. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
12. The CACRs were amended in 1993 to conform with the Cuban Democracy
Act. For a discussion of these changes, see infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
13. The CACRs pertain to any person within the United States, including:
(1) Any person, wheresoever located, who is a resident of the United
States;
(2) Any person actually within the United States;
(3) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of
any state, territory, possession, or district of the United States; and
(4) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, where-
soever organized, or doing business, which is owned or controlled by any
person or persons specified in paragraphs . . . (1), (2), or (3) of the sec-
tion.
31 C.F.R. § 515.330 (1993).
The CACRs, like the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500
(1993) and the Transaction Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 505 (1993), are export
control laws that potentially apply to foreign-based subsidiary corporations. All
three sets of regulations are authorized by the TWEA.
14. Cuba has been classified by the Export Administration Regulations (EARs)
as a "Group Z Countrv." meaning that it is an embargoed destination. As of De-
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that exporters apply 5 for an export license and receive ap-
proval through the Department of the Treasury. 6 While it
was initially difficult for a foreign-based subsidiary of an
American company to trade with Cuba, the CACRs did allow
foreign-based subsidiaries to trade as long as the law of the
foreign country favored or "required" such trade. 7 However,
799 (1993). The EARs are derived from the Export Administration Act. 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988).
15. This process has been established by the Export Administration Act (EAA)
and its regulations, the EARs, and applies to all export regulations, not only those
to Cuba. "The Export Administration Regulations shall apply to individual export
license applications and to individual validated licenses . . . ." 15 C.F.R. § 772.1(a)
(1993). "Individual license" is defined as "[a]ny validated license . . . authorizing
the export of specific technical data or a specified quantity of commodities during
a specified period to a designated consignee." 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1993). In general,
most exports require either a general license, which is a standing authority to
export and requires no special application or approval from any United States
government entity, 15 C.F.R. § 771.1 (1993), or a validated license which authoriz-
es specific transactions as described in the license application, 15 C.F.R. § 772.9(a)
(1993), and requires governmental approval of transactions, for a period of twenty-
four months, or longer if the project warrants it. 15 C.F.R. § 722.9(d)(1)-(2) (1993).
The application for, and decision to grant, a license is handled on a case-by-case
basis, and there is generally no precedental value to a previous history of export-
ing. W. Clark McFadden, II et al., The Structure of Export Licensing, in 1 THE
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 389 (Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 570, 1987).
Holders of licenses are held "strictly accountable" for use of the license. 15
C.F.R. § 787.9 (1993). Sanctions for violations of export control rules may be im-
posed on persons and firms within the United States and outside its borders. 15
C.F.R. § 770.2 (1993) (definition of "person or firm"). In addition, persons who are
related by ownership control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connec-
tion to a violator may be subject to sanctions. 15 C.F.R. § 769.1(b) (1993). A
party's property may be seized and subjected to forfeiture if it is, or is intended to
be, exported in violation of export controls, even if the party is not otherwise
involved in the violation. 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(b)(4) (1993). Sanctions may also include
criminal fines and imprisonment and administrative actions such as the denial of
export privileges, ineligibility as a recipient of United States export or re-exports,
and exclusion from practice before the International Trade Administration. 15
C.F.R. §§ 787.1, 788.3 (1993).
16. While the Department of Commerce has been given general authority over
most export licenses by the EAA, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2416 (1988), and the
related EARs, 15 C.F.R. §§ 768-799 (1993), when a country such as Cuba has been
designated by the president as the target of an embargo because of a national
emergency or war, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) will regulate all transactions pursuant to either the TWEA or IEEPA. See,
e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 768.2(9) n.1 (discussing those countries with whom United States
person must have approval by the Treasury Department); 31 C.F.R. § 515.801(b)(6)
(1993) (issuing of licenses to trade with Cuba); 515.502(a)(1993) (licensing by Trea-
sury pursuant to TWEA). The regulations concerning Cuba are similar, though not
exact, to the EARs. For the Cuban regulations, see 31 C.F.R. §§ 500-545 (1993).
17. According to the CACRs in force prior to the passage of the Cuban De-
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for several years after the CACRs were instituted, the United
States exerted informal governmental pressure on parent com-
panies to direct their subsidiaries to minimize or stop trade
with Cuba."
Licensing policies were liberalized in 1975, at which time
the Department of Commerce was advised to look "favorably"
on exports from United States foreign-based subsidiaries to
Cuba. 9 However, within two years the regulations were again
revised so that no domestic corporation, officer, or employee
could assist in a subsidiary transaction involving Cuba.2" Sub-
mocracy Act, subsidiary trade with Cuba was permitted if:
(i) The commodities to be exported are non-strategic;
(ii) United States-origin technical data (other than maintenance, repair
and operations data) will not be transferred;
(iii) If any U.S.-origin parts and components are included therein, such
inclusion has been authorized by the Department of Commerce;
(iv) If any U.S.-origin spares are to be re-exported to Cuba in connection
with a licensed transaction, such reexport has been authorized by the
Department of Commerce;
(v) No U.S. dollar accounts are involved; and
(vi) Any financing or other extension of credit by a U.S.-owned or con-
trolled firm is granted on normal short-term conditions which are appro-
priate for the commodity to be exported.
31 C.F.R. § 515.559(b)(1) (1992).
18. Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign Subsidiaries:
Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 319, 330
n.42 (1983) (quoting the former Chief Counsel for Foreign Assets Control, Stanley
Sommerfield).
Foreign nations, in particular Canada, have protested attempts by the Unit-
ed States to curtail foreign subsidiary trading, and in some cases obtained modifi-
cation of the policies. For example, the United States issued a Canadian subsid-
iary of an American automobile company the necessary license to trade with Cuba
after Canada's Prime Minister Trudeau personally intervened. Id. at 332 n.45. The
United States also made an exception in the case of Argentina after that country
threatened to nationalize an American-owned subsidiary that was facing United
States restrictions in trading with Cuba. Id. Then Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger stated that the 1974 Argentinean and Canadian deals were licensed so
as to allow the behavior of American companies in those countries to comply with
the Cuban policies of the host countries. DE MESTRAL & GRUcHALLA-WESIERSKI,
supra note 8, at 213 (citing DEP'T ST. BULL., May 1974, at 537).
19. This liberalization brought United States policy in line with the policy of
the Organization of American States, which allows each member state to deter-
mine the nature of its economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba. 15 C.F.R. §
785.1(c) (1993). The Department of Commerce was directed to grant licenses on a
case-by-case basis as long as the subsidiary's domiciliary state permitted such
trade. Id.; see also DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1975, at 404.
20. Thompson, supra note 18, at 332 nn.48-49 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 515.559,
.559(c) (1982)). Congress further attempted to rein in trade with Cuba after Cuba's
involvement in Africa became known in the late 1970s, but the Carter administra-
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sidiaries had to demonstrate a high degree of separateness
from their corporate parent in order to take advantage of the
export exemption available to them.21 Even with these restric-
tions, from 1982 to 1989 more than 1,236 licenses were grant-
ed to United States foreign subsidiaries and only forty-three
applications were denied. 2 As a result, in 1991 alone, United
States subsidiaries did $718 million in trade with Cuba, which
represented eighteen percent of the total goods that Cuba pur-
chased with hard currency on the world market.'
These statistics deeply disturbed anti-Castro forces in the
United States who believe Fidel Castro will likely remain in
power as long as Cuba continues to be the recipient of cash
from trade. Many have favored the complete economic isolation
of Cuba in order to force the ouster of both Castro and commu-
nism.' The Cuban Democracy Act was passed in October
1992 in an attempt to do just that.
B. The Cuban Democracy Act
1. The Purpose of the Act
The Cuban Democracy Act25 was enacted based upon con-
gressional belief that the United States has an opportunity to
promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba because of
the fall of communism in the Soviet Union," and the "now
tion refused, believing that more restrictions on foreign-based subsidiaries would
damage international economic relations. Thompson, supra note 18, at 333.
21. A subsidiary had to show general independence from its parent in its
decisions, negotiations, financial arrangements, and transactions concerning Cuba.
If a subsidiary had many managers in common with the parent, it would not be
considered independent and thus would not qualify for a license. In effect, many
foreign-based subsidiaries of American corporations continued to be prohibited from
trading with Cuba. Thompson, supra note 18, at 333 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(c)
(1982)).
22. Connie Mack, Should U.S. Ban Trade With Cuba by U.S. Subsidiaries?
Yes, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 12, 1992, at 6C. Mr. Mack was a sponsor of the prede-
cessor bill to the Cuban Democracy Act, which also called for a cutoff of foreign
subsidiary trade. Id.
23. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, Nov. 1992,
available in LEXIS, Predicasts (ISSN: 8756-324X).
24. Mack, supra note 22.
25. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (Supp. IV 1988). The Act was sponsored by United
States Congressman Robert Torricelli, and is colloquially known as the "Torricelli
Bill."
26. The sponsors of the Act were "[s]timulated by the dramatic changes in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that sharply reduced trade, assistance, and
19941 403
404 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XX:2
universal recognition in Latin America" and the Caribbean
that Cuba provides a failed model of government."8 According
to the sponsors of the Act, Fidel Castro may be ousted by im-
posing further restrictions on trade with Cuba. The Act justi-
fies these further restrictions by reference to the Castro
government's consistent disregard for internationally accepted
standards of human rights and democratic values29 and be-
cause "[tihere is no sign that the Castro regime is prepared to
make any significant concessions to democracy or to undertake
any form of democratic opening."
30
Among other goals, the Act intends to speed the termina-
tion of any remaining military or technical assistance from any
former state of the Soviet Union,31 to oppose human rights
violations perpetrated by the Castro regime,32 to maintain
sanctions until the Castro regime moves toward democracy and
ideological support to which Cuba was accustomed." S. REP. No. 35, 103d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 124 (1993).
27. While this statement may be correct, it is also true that "virtually every
Latin American nation maintains diplomatic and trade ties with Havana and op-
poses the [Cuban Democracy Act]." Ben Barber, US Policy Toward Cuba Shows
Signs of Change, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 28, 1993, at 6.
28. 22 U.S.C. § 6001(6) (Supp. IV 1988).
While the Cuban revolution certainly benefitted Cuba's ordinary citizens-all
Cubans, for instance, have free medical, dental, and ophthalmological care-the
deepening poverty of the country has changed the free daily glass of milk provided
to each school child to sugared water. Russell Warren Howe, Fidel's Little Hell:
Cuba Without Libre--or Coffee, WASH. POST, June 27, 1993, at C3. In 1991, prior
to the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act, Cuba's per capita income was less
than $1,500. Its economy had declined at an annual rate of 0.8% between 1986
and 1989. Mack, supra note 22. The poverty stems, at least in part, from the
many years it has been under embargo by the United States, and more recently
because Cuba lost the Soviet Union as its major trading partner. The Soviet Un-
ion provided, among other things, 100% of Cuba's wood and cotton imports, 99% of
its petroleum, 80% of its fertilizer, and 96.3% of its tractors. CARIBBEAN 1993
BUSINESS DIRECTORY, supra note 6, at 78. In 1990 the Soviet Union provided 66%
of Cuba's imports (by value) and received 81% of Cuba's exports. THE STATESMAN'S
YEAR-BOOK 1993-1994, at 470 (Brian Hunter ed., 1993). Many believe that Cuba
was in such dire economic straits prior to the enactment of the Cuban Democracy
Act that its passage was "like stabbing a corpse." Guy Gugliotta, Exiles Urge Mod-
eration Toward Cuba, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1993, at A5 (quoting Eloy Gutierrez
Menoyo).
29. 22 U.S.C. § 6001(1) (Supp. IV 1988). Americas Watch, an international
monitoring group, has reported that there have been many instances of human
rights abuses in Cuba. Mimi Whitefield, Rights in Cuba: A Bleak Report, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 12, 1992, at 22A.
30. 22 U.S.C. § 6001(4) (Supp. IV 1988).
31. 22 U.S.C. § 6002(4) (Supp. IV 1988).
32. 22 U.S.C. § 6002(5) (Supp. IV 1988).
1994] THE CUBANDEMOCRACYACT 405
a greater respect for human rights and then to reduce sanc-
tions in response to positive developments in Cuba," and to
initiate the development of a comprehensive policy toward a
post-Castro Cuba. 4 The Act states that the president should
"encourage" the governments of countries that trade with Cuba
to restrict their trade in order to further the purposes of the
Act.35
2. The Provisions of the Act
The Act's provisions are varied.38 Perhaps looking toward
the future, the Act permits the establishment of telecommuni-
cations between Cuba and the United States37 as well as di-
33. 22 U.S.C. § 6002(6)-(7) (Supp. IV 1988). Congress will eliminate all sanc-
tions when the president reports that Cuba has held free and open elections, has
moved to establish a free market economic system, and is committed to constitu-
tional change to ensure continued free and fair elections. 22 U.S.C. § 6007(a)(1)-(5)
(Supp. IV 1988).
34. 22 U.S.C. § 6002(10) (Supp. IV 1988).
35. 22 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (Supp. IV 1988). If a nation does assist Cuba, the
president may designate that country ineligible for either assistance under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or debt forgiveness under the Arms Export Control
Act. 22 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1988). By the terms of the Act, "assis-
tance" means "grant, concessional sale, guaranty, or insurance, or by any other
means on terms more favorable than that generally available in the applicable
market, whether in the form of a loan, lease, credit, or otherwise . . . ." 22 U.S.C.
§ 6003(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1988). Since the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc coun-
tries were the only countries likely to provide these favorable terms, and those
governments no longer exist, it may be that this language was inserted for politi-
cal reasons, without any real need or intent to back it up.
36. The report of the House of Representatives summing up the legislative
year described the Act's provisions as "consisting of both carrots and sticks, de-
signed to hasten a democratic transition in Cuba .... " H.R. REP. No. 1079, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1992).
37. 22 U.S.C. 6004(e) (Supp. IV 1988). This provision may undermine the Act's
intention to limit access by Cuba to cash because it will allow United States tele-
phone companies to pay Cuba for handling calls. The likely increase in the num-
ber of calls from Cuba means that Cuba "stands to reap millions of dollars annu-
ally" since, like most foreign countries, it charges seven times the cost of complet-
ing an international call. Jube Shiver, Jr., U.S. to Ease Rules on Phone Access to
Cuba, L.A. TIIES, July 24, 1993, at D1.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) did not believe Cuba would allow
the establishment of telecommunications service, and therefore did not budget any
federal funding for such a project. H.R. REP. No. 615 (II), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1992). The CBO appears to have been correct in its assumptions. As of October
1993, negotiations to rebuild telephone links between American telephone compa-
nies and the Cuban government had stalled. Anthony Faiola, The Elusive Connec-
tion: Cuba Balks at Terms for Phone Service, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 21, 1993, at 1C.
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rect mail delivery."8 However, travel is closely monitored and
strict limits are established on remittances to Cuba by United
States persons who finance travel of Cubans to the United
States.39 In addition, the Act restricts American-owned or con-
trolled vessels without a license from entering a Cuban port for
any reason and from loading or unloading freight anywhere in
the United States within 180 days after departure from Cu-
ba,40 although there is a limited exception to allow human-
itarian donations of food,41 medicine, and medical supplies."
Lastly, the Cuban Democracy Act amends the longstand-
ing provision of the CACRs that allowed foreign-based subsid-
iaries to trade with Cuba. The Act prohibits the Treasury
Department's OFAC from issuing future export licenses43 to
all United States foreign-based subsidiaries wanting to export
to Cuba with the exceptions, as noted above, for medical sup-
plies, food, and telecommunications-related matters.44 Those
who violate its provisions will be assessed the penalties set
forth in the TWEA.45 A violation by a foreign-based subsidiary
38. 22 U.S.C. § 6004(f) (Supp. IV 1988). The CBO, noting Cuba's history of
refusing to accept direct mail service from the United States, assumed that mail
service would not be established and thus did not budget for it. H.R. REP. No.
615(11), supra note 37.
39. 22 U.S.C. § 6005(c) (Supp. IV 1988). This provision is to prevent the Cu-
ban government from gaining access to excess United States currency. Id.
40. 22 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1988). Furthermore, no vessel may carry
goods or passengers, or goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has any inter-
est, to or from Cuba without authorization from the Secretary of the Treasury. 22
U.S.C. § 6005(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1988). These rules are reflected in amendments to
the CACRs. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.207 (1993).
41. 22 U.S.C. § 6004(b) (Supp. IV 1988).
42. 22 U.S.C. § 6004(c) (Supp. IV 1988). The provisions concerning food and
medical supplies derive from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. For the general
policy of the Foreign Assistance Act, see 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1990).
43. The Act allows licenses only for transactions arranged by contract entered
into prior to October 23, 1992. 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1988).
44. 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1988). The Cuban Democracy Act thus
amends the CACRs, which had read, in relevant part: "Transactions by U.S.-owned
or controlled foreign firms with Cuba .... Specific licenses will be issued in ap-
propriate cases for certain categories of transactions between U.S.-owned or con-
trolled firms in third countries and Cuba, where local law requires, or policy in
the third country favors, trade with Cuba." 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1992).
45. 22 U.S.C. § 6009(d) (Supp. IV 1988). TWEA imposes criminal fines of up
to $1,000,000 and/or prison sentences of up to ten years, and/or civil penalties of
up to $50,000. 50 U.S.C. app. § 16(a)-(c) (Supp. IV 1988).
In a curious provision, the Cuban Democracy Act states that its provisions
pertain to "any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence in
the United States, and any corporation, partnership, or other organization orga-
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occurs if it is apprehended in a trade with Cuba without the
necessary license, which of course it will not have been able to
obtain due to the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act.46
The passage of the Cuban Democracy Act caused interna-
tional uproar. Many nations' officials have been outspoken
about their disagreement with United States attempts to regu-
late the trade of American-owned or controlled subsidiaries
located and incorporated in non-United States territory. These
officials have stated that such action violates the sovereignty of
other nations, has no jurisdictional basis, and contravenes
established principles of international law.4"
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION AND
THEIR APPLICATION TO THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT
The existence of the Cuban Democracy Act highlights some
of the differences in how the international community under-
stands certain principles of international law. As this next
section will discuss, the legal status of international corpora-
tions that own foreign-based subsidiaries remains unsettled.48
As a result, each state interprets the existing laws and princi-
ples to further its own interests and the interests of organiza-
tions incorporated within its territory. Such diversity in inter-
preting international law has created great conflict between
how the United States and other countries identify and im-
plement principles of international jurisdiction,4" especially
nized under the laws of the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 6010 (Supp. IV 1988) (em-
phasis added). However, were a foreign-based subsidiary to engage in unlicensed
trade with Cuba, it would violate both § 6005(a)(1) of the Cuban Democracy Act
and the section of the CACRs amended by the Cuban Democracy Act, 15 C.F.R. §
515.559 (1993). The CACR penalties, like those of the Cuban Democracy Act, are
those provided for in the TWEA. See 22 U.S.C. § 6009(d) (Supp. IV 1988); 31
C.F.R. § 515.701(a) (1993). It therefore appears that § 6010 of the Cuban Democ-
racy Act is not particularly meaningful in the context of the whole Act.
46. For the licensing procedure in general, see supra notes 15-16.
47. See infra Part IV.B.1.
48. See infra note 52.
49. The United States' understanding can be gleaned from a publication of the
American Law Institute. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, (American Law Institute, 1987) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)]. The Restatement (Third) sought to articulate rules of public inter-
national law for the use of American policymakers, judges, lawyers, and scholars.
It should be remembered that it is a product of American minds and American
legal understandings. Other countries do not always agree with the law as articu-
lated. A.D. NEALE AND M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONAL
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over corporate subsidiaries. This discord" will be resolved on-
ly when such jurisdictional questions are settled consistently
within the international community.
A. Foreign Branches and Subsidiaries
Can a state establish laws that govern companies incorpo-
rated in other countries? The law of corporations is, of course,
state law. Special jurisdictional issues51 arise, therefore, when
a corporation expands beyond its national borders. 2 If a par-
ent corporation establishes a branch, it establishes an exten-
sion of the main office and is allowed to be present in the coun-
try through that branch.53 The parent will also be held liable
for the branch's actions by the state in which the branch is
domiciled.54 If a parent corporation instead establishes a sub-
sidiary,55 it establishes an entity with a separate and inde-
JURISDICTION 166 & n.1 (1988). There is no unanimous agreement with either its
perspective or that the specific applications suggested can be used as rules of
international law to resolve jurisdictional disputes. MARK J. JANIS, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 341 (1993); Thompson, supra note 18, at 321 (1983);
see Kathleen Hixson, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Third Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 127
(1988). Nonetheless, it is often relied on and will be used throughout this Note.
When it differs from customary international law understandings, it will be so
noted.
50. For further discussion, see infra part IW.B.1.
51. Until the early twentieth century, corporate law, which is a part of munic-
ipal law, and the territorial principle of international law were in harmony. A
corporation was created by or under the laws of a single state and it operated
only in that state, with its activities subject only to the laws of that state. If a
state permitted a foreign corporation to act in its territory without local incorpora-
tion, then the corporation was subject to that state's laws. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 49, § 414 illus. 1; see also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
519, 588 (1835) ("corporation[s] can have no legal existence out of the boundaries
of the sovereignty by which [they are] created.").
52. The term for this corporate entity is a multinational or transnational
corporation or entity. Such a corporation is usually made up of "a group of corpo-
rations, each established under the law of some state, linked by common manage-
rial and financial control and pursuing integrated policies." RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 49, § 213 cmt. f (1987). The Restatement (Third) notes that while mul-
tinationals are established as a part of international economic life, their status in
municipal and international law is not well defined, id., thus causing problems
such as the one under discussion in this Note.
53. CLIVE M. SCHMirTHOFF, SCHMITrHOFF'S EXPORT TRADE 318 (9th ed. 1990).
54. Id. at 320. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the parent company of a
branch must register as an 'oversea company," and provide the name and address
of a resident authorized to accept service of process on its behalf. Thus, the non-
British corporation can be sued in English courts just as any resident. Id.
55. A subsidiary corporation is one controlled by another corporation and may
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pendent legal personality" from the parent.57 A corporation
located in one state with a subsidiary in -another state is thus
both a single entity and two entities that share common own-
ership and control. Multinational corporations raise questions
in international law: How is it determined which state has
jurisdiction over the subsidiary located in a separate nation
from its parent? Does the state of incorporation have the right
to prescribe and enforce laws over the subsidiary because it is
located and incorporated within that state? When, if ever, does
be wholly owned or partially owned by that parent. DETLEv F. VAGTs, BASIc COR-
PORATION LAW 810 (3d ed. 1989).
56. The legal separation between parent and subsidiary may be extinguished
and the multinational corporation treated as one economic unit when to do other-
wise "would lead to inequitable results or to results contrary to legal policy."
IGNAZ SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 5
(1987). For instance, international law recognizes that a foreign-based subsidiary
has no protection from the parent's state if the parent is using the subsidiary to
engage in activities that are illegal in the parent state. Judgment of Sept. 17,
1982, (Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.), District
Court at the Hague, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 66, 73 (1983). In these situations, in-
ternational law allows the court to look behind the legal entity and consider who
are the actual beneficiaries in a particular situation. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra,
at 5.
57. SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 53, at 318. The laws to establish a subsidiary
vary greatly. For instance, some countries, including the Commonwealth countries,
the United States, France, Spain, and Germany, allow free registration of subsid-
iaries. SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 53, at 325. In others, such as the Netherlands
and Finland, permission must be obtained prior to establishing a subsidiary. Other
states, including Turkey, Indonesia, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Haiti,
and Honduras require a license, and permission may be refused. SCHMITTHOFF,
supra note 53, at 325. Still others, such as Nigeria, require a subsidiary's estab-
lishment in order for a foreign company to carry on business within that country.
SCHMI'THOFF, supra note 53, at 321 & n.19 (citing the Nigerian Decree No. 51 of
1968). Others have rules covering particular industries. Canada, for instance, only
gives development rights in certain areas relating to oil exploration to locally char-
tered companies with a certain amount of local ownership. Thompson, supra note
18, at 392.
Many states legislate how much control can be wielded by non-nationals.
States vary widely as to restrictions on non-resident participation in the corporate
structure. For instance, in the member states of the European Community, as well
as many commonwealth countries, Austria, and Israel, there are no restrictions on
participation of non-residents or foreign shareholders or directors. In Sweden all
the founders of a company must be Swedish subjects; in some states of the United
States, including New York and Pennsylvania, a majority of promoters must be
American citizens. In Mexico and the United Arab Republic, fifty-one percent of
the share capital must be owned by nationals. In Sweden and Finland, four-fifths
of the capital must be owned by nationals and cannot be transferred to aliens. Re-
strictions on the right of a company to own land occur in Canada, Mexico, and
the Philippines, among others. SCHIMITTHOFF, supra note 53, at 325-26.
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the parent corporation's state of incorporation have the right to
prescribe and enforce laws over the entire multinational?
Which state has the right to claim a corporation as its nation-
al?58
B. Principles of Prescriptive Jurisdiction59
There are several recognized bases of sovereign" jurisdic-
tion in international law. The first and most basic principle is
that of territoriality-that each sovereign nation has the right
to exercise jurisdiction and control over matters within its
territory." Related to territorial jurisdiction are two other
58. A well-established principle of international law is that the law does not
allocate individuals to states; the state is to claim persons as its nationals. Chris-
topher Staker, Diplomatic Protection of Private Business Companies: Determining
Corporate Personality for International Law Purposes, 61 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 155,
160 (1990). It is possible to make an analogy between a state's conferring of citi-
zenship upon an individual, thereby creating the presumption that it will also
confer nationality in international law, and a state's incorporating a company un-
der its municipal law, raising the presumption that it intends to consider the
company a national under international law. Id. at 160-61. Staker suggests that
the act of incorporation may not usually include such a presumption. Id. at 161. It
will be suggested later in this note that such a presumption should be created.
See infra part V.B.2.
59. "Jurisdiction" in international law refers to the legal power or competence
of a state to exercise governmental functions. JANIS, supra note 49, at 322. There
are three aspects of jurisdiction, based on function. This section will discuss juris-
diction to prescribe, which refers to the ability of a state to create legislation that
passes municipal and international muster. See Otto Schachter, General Course in
Public International Law in 5 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (1982). Whether the United States has prescriptive ju-
risdiction is often a crucial question in foreign policy trade embargoes. The second
type of jurisdiction is that of adjudication which, according to the Restatement
(Third), gives the courts of a state the right to exercise jurisdiction "if the rela-
tionship of the state to the person or thing is such as to make the exercise of
jurisdiction reasonable." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 421(1). The third
type of jurisdiction is that of enforcement, which requires that the state's law be
internationally valid in order for the state to be allowed to "induce or compel
compliance" of its laws. Schachter, supra, at 249; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 49, § 401(c). For enforcement jurisdiction of the Cuban Democracy Act, see
infra part IV.A. All three types are closely connected; this Note will mainly be
concerned with the first and third types.
60. "Sovereignty" describes the "whole body of rights and attributes which a
State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States, and also in its
relations with other States." Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 43 (Apr. 9).
61. "[A] state occupies a definite part of the surface of the earth, within which
it normally exercises . . . jurisdiction over persons and things to the exclusion of
the jurisdiction- of other states." J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 162 (6th ed.
1963). In its purest form, territoriality states that "the character of an act as
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important concepts. One is that of territorial integrity, which
gives a state the right to demand that other states refrain from
committing acts that violate the independence or territorial
supremacy of that state. The other is nonintervention, which
requires that a state not interfere with the internal or external
affairs of another state. 2 A state may thus make laws that
pertain to persons and activities within its territory and no
other state may interfere.
In addition to territoriality, there are five other recognized
bases of jurisdiction. These other principles are based on extra-
territorial principles. 3 They are the principles of nationality,
passive personality, universality, protection, and a subgroup of
territoriality called objective jurisdiction, or "the effects doc-
trine."64 In brief, the nationality principle allows a state to
have jurisdiction over its nationals, wherever they are locat-
ed.65 Passive personality gives jurisdiction based on the na-
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done." American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356
(1909). The Restatement (Third) says a state has territorial jurisdiction when there
is "conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory" and
involves "the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 402(1)(a)-(b). Territoriality is the most
commonly accepted basis of state jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
49, § 402 cmt. b.
62. Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979
Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308, 1319 & nn.70-71
(1983) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Application of EAAI.
63. Extraterritoriality refers to the operation of laws upon persons or rights
outside the borders of the enacting state. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 588 (6th ed.
1990). The use of extraterritorial jurisdiction was given international approval in
the Lotus case. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept.
7) (addressing the question of whether international law forbade Turkey from
applying its criminal laws to the conduct of the French officer in control of the
French ship that collided with a Turkish vessel on the high seas, causing several
Turkish deaths). The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held that a
state may use its municipal law in an international sphere unless it can be shown
that there exists a principle of international law which restricts the state from
acting. Id. at 23. Legislative acts that are considered extraterritorial include those
on the part of the United States, such as the Cuban Democracy Act, that attempt
to control the activities of multinational corporations outside United States territo-
ry. See SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 56, at 14.
64. For a brief definition by the Third Circuit of all these principles, see Unit-
ed States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 167 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986).
65. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (holding that an
American citizen, living in Paris, still has the responsibilities of citizenship and
must respond to a subpoena served on him); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S.
717 (1952) (holder of American and Japanese citizenship, residing in Japan, still
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tionality of the victim of an action.66 The universality prin-
ciple allows a state to have jurisdiction over individuals who
have engaged in certain heinous, universally condemned
crimes. 7 The protective principle allows a state jurisdiction
over non-nationals when their conduct is directed against the
security of the state.6" Objective jurisdiction, or the effects
doctrine, gives a state jurisdiction when conduct occurs outside
the state's territory which is intended to have, and which does
have, an injurious effect within the state.69 If any of these
owes allegiance to United States and can be punished for acts of treason). The
Restatement (Third) states that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with re-
spect to "the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as
well as within its territory." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 402(2).
66. This principle, though accepted in the United States and elsewhere, is
used sparingly. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 59, at 245 ("controversial base of
jurisdiction"); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (2d ed. 1973)
(the "least justifiable" of all bases). The Restatement (Third) allows the use of
passive personality when a criminal act is committed outside a state's territory by
a non-national against a victim who is a national. The principle is accepted most
often when applied to terrorism or other organized attacks on a state's nationals
by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic represen-
tatives. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 402 cmt. g. The Restatement
(Third) notes that the United States applied passive personality in the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2231 (1988), which
makes it a crime to kill or conspire to kill a United States national outside of
American territory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 402(2), reporters' note
3.
67. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) (allowing a person charged with crimes committed in
Nazi concentration camps to be extradited to Israel); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 49, § 404 (allowing universal jurisdiction to define and punish
certain offenses "recognized by the community of nations as of universal con-
cern . . . even where none of the [other] bases of jurisdiction . . . is present").
68. Besides the security of the state, the protective principle might allow a
state to have jurisdiction over those whose actions are against certain other crucial
state interests. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 402(3); see United States v.
Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (giving United States jurisdiction over
alien who committed perjury in Mexico when applying for a non-immigrant visa).
One commentator has noted that United States law, which embraced the protec-
tive principle later than most of European law, "scarcely distinguish[es]" the pro-
tective principle from the effects principle. D.P. O'CONNELL, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW
830 (1970). For the effects principle, see infra note 69 and accompanying text.
69. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945) (defining the effects doctrine as it pertains to antitrust law). In intervening
years, this formulation has been modified in the United States. NEALE &
STEPHENS, supra note 49, at 16. See Restatement (Third) which states that a state
has jurisdiction with respect to "conduct outside its territory that has or is intend-
ed to have substantial effect within its territory." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 49, § 402(1)(c) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Wright-Barker, 784
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bases of jurisdiction is present, the minimum requirement for
jurisdiction has been met in international law and a state may
prescribe laws that will have effect over the actions of non-
nationals who are not present in the state's territory."
In an ideal world, the fact that a subsidiary is physically
"located" in a particular state would lead to the assumption
that by the principle of territoriality, the subsidiary is under
the jurisdiction of its state of incorporation. In most situations,
this is in fact the case. However, when a state chooses to act
F.2d 161, 168 (3rd Cir. 1986) (holding that a conspiracy to import 23 tons of mari-
juana would have had a harmful effect within the United States); Gary B. Born, A
Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & PoLY INT'L BUS.
1, 32-34 (1992) (effects in antitrust law).
70. However, the mere existence of a basis in itself may not be sufficient in
itself to confer jurisdiction. Schachter, supra note 59, at 245-46. In recent years,
there has been a move to require that actions be "reasonable" as well as legally
possible. Schachter, supra note 59, at 245-46. This view is reflected in Restatement
(Third)'s § 403, entitled "Limits on Jurisdiction to Prescribe." The Restatement
(Third) acknowledges that "[e]ven when one of the bases for jurisdiction . . . is
present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such
jurisdiction is unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 403(1). To
determine whether a particular course of action is reasonable, the Restatement
(Third) calls for an evaluation of the relationship of the parties, the activities, and
the particular states involved, as well as the importance and international accep-
tance of the regulation causing the dispute. The Restatement (Third) lists "relevant
factors" that are used to determine when jurisdiction would be reasonable. These
factors include:
(a)the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has sub-
stantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b)the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c)the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regula-
tion is generally accepted;
(d)the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e)the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f)the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g)the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h)the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 403(2)(a)-(h).
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extraterritorially, the principle of territoriality and its allied
concepts of territorial integrity and nonintervention7 are
challenged. The Cuban Democracy Act is an example of extra-
territorial action because it explicitly forbids most foreign-
based American-owned or controlled subsidiaries from trading
with Cuba, regardless of the interests of the incorporating
state. The United States bases its jurisdictional reach on the
fact that the subsidiaries it seeks to regulate are American-
owned or controlled, and that this "control" makes the subsid-
iary a national of the United States and thus subject to its
jurisdiction. The determination of corporate nationality takes
on international legal importance because international subsid-
iaries are often located in one state but are owned or controlled
or both by a foreign corporation.
C. The Nationality of a Corporation
To speak of the "nationality" of a corporation is to speak of
a concept the characteristics of which are defined by municipal
law.72 It is municipal law that confers nationality upon the
citizens of a state, either by birth or through well-established
"links" between the individual and the state.73 Municipal law
also confers legal existence on corporations organized within a
state.7 4 However, municipal law in general has not addressed
the characteristics that establish a primary bond between a
corporation and a state when that corporation is multinational
and therefore has links with more than one state.75
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave its imprima-
tur to the "traditional" rule in international law in the case of
Barcelona Traction.76 Barcelona Traction was brought before
71. For territorial integrity and non-intervention, see supra text accompanying
note 62.
72. Municipal law grants natural persons their nationality through family ties
or other genuine "links" with a state. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955
I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 6). "[Njationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact
of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, togeth-
er with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties." Id. at 23. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), iupra note 49, § 211 & cmt. c; O'CONNELL, supra note 68, at 1040.
73. See Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 20, 23.
74. BROWNLIE, supra note 66, at 409.
75. O'CONNELL, supra note 68, at 1040.
76. Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg, v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Second Phase) (Feb. 5). The Barcelona Traction Company,
whose principal shareholder was a Belgian company, was incorporated under Cana-
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the ICJ to determine whether Canada, the state in which Bar-
celona Traction was incorporated, or Belgium, the state of
which its shareholders were nationals, had the legal capacity
to bring suit on behalf of the corporation against Spain, where
the corporation was conducting business. The ICJ held that
Belgium lacked a legal interest in the subject matter of the
claim. It stated that "the general rule of international law
authorizes the national State of the company alone to make a
claim."77 Since the question concerned the protection of corpo-
rate rights, it is the place of incorporation or seat of business
that has predominant rights to the corporate life, not the state
of the shareholders' nationality. "
dian law and had its registered office in Toronto. It was formed to develop electric
power in Spain, and had created several subsidiaries for that purpose. A suit had
been brought against Spanish authorities for various misdeeds. BROWNLIE, supra
note 66, at 477-80.
"The traditional rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a corpo-
rate entity to the State under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose
territory it has its registered office." Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 42. See
J.G. CASTEL, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 134 (1988) ("interna-
tional law, generally, does not recognize a state's prescriptive jurisdiction over
foreign corporations abroad on the basis of the status of their shareholders"). Brit-
ish law, for instance, "stands firmly on the principle that the nationality of a
corporation is determined by the place of incorporation and that a state is not
entitled to regulate the activities of a company incorporated in another state on
the basis that a whole, or substantial part, of its shareholding is owned or con-
trolled by nationals of the state concerned." THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF NATIONAL LAWS 38 n.170 (Dieter Lange & Gary Born, eds., 1987) (quoting re-
marks by William Beckett (July 17, 1985) in William C. Beckett, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The Broader Context of the Conflict, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 829 (1985)).
The United States has, at least sometimes, accepted that mere incorporation can
give a state the right to protect its corporation. See O'CONNELL, supra note 68, at
104041 & nn.49-51 (citing several arbitration agreements between the United
States and other countries affirming nationality based on incorporation); see also
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (holding that
Japanese subsidiary incorporated in New York was subject to the laws of the
United States). A European case following the same logic is that of Judgment of
Sept. 17, 1982 District Court at the Hague (Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles
S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983) (holding that
American subsidiary based in Holland was subject to laws of the Netherlands and
not the United States).
77. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 46.
78. Id. at 42-45. The "seat of business" is also termed the "registered office."
European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with
the U.S.S.R., reproduced in 21 I.L.M. 891, 894 (1982) (stating that Barcelona Trac-
tion declared that "two traditional criteria for determining the nationality of com-
panies; i.e. the place of incorporation and the place of the registered office of the
company concerned, had been 'confirmed by long practice . . '").
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Many commentators have suggested that corporate nation-
ality should be conferred only if, in addition to the act of incor-
poration, there exist "genuine links" to the state of incorpora-
tion.79 Three "links" have been identified to determine juris-
diction."0 The first link between the corporation and the state
is domicile, defined as the location of the company's manageri-
al, administrative, and legal existence.8' The second is control,
the location of the seat of economic control and influence. 2
The third is siege social, a term that derives from French law
and is quite similar to the concept of "domicile"; siege social in-
cludes both incorporation and administrative direction. 3 A
state of incorporation that has other "links" to the subsidiary is
in a much stronger position to assert jurisdiction over the
subsidiary on the basis of nationality.
By the traditional rule, in order to determine a
corporation's nationality, the act of incorporation alone will
tend to confer jurisdiction. The existence of links will add
weight to such a designation. However, the existence of links
79. See BROWNLIE, supra note 66, at 409; O'CONNELL, supra note 68, at 1040-
41. These commentators have borrowed the municipal law concept of "genuine
links" between the individual and the state of nationality and applied it to corpo-
rate existence. In Barcelona Traction, the ICJ noted that sometimes "further or
different links" are thought to be required, but then stated that there is no "ab-
solute test" which has found general acceptance. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at
42. However, although the ICJ seemed to reject the "genuine links" test, it also
explicitly listed Barcelona Traction's links to Canada, including that the company
had been incorporated for more than fifty years in Canada, had maintained its
registered office in Toronto, had its accounts and share registers there, often had
board meetings there, and was listed in the records of the Canadian tax authori-
ties. BROWNLIE, supra note 66, at 476 (citing Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at
42).
80. BROWNLIE, supra note 66, at 409 (writing post-Barcelona Traction and
stating that nationality is derived either from incorporation or from "links" such as
the "centre of administration (siege social) and the national basis of ownership and
control"); cf. O'CONNELL, supra note 68, at 1040-41 (writing prior to Barcelona
Traction and stating there are four "links," incorporation being the first link, and
the others being those the ones discussed infra at text accompanying notes 82 and
83).
81. O'CONNELL, supra note 68, at 1041. Professor O'Connell uses "domicile" as
a criterion when a company is simultaneously incorporated in several companies.
O'CONNELL, supra note 68, at 1041.
82. BROWNLIE, supra note 66, at 474. At least one commentator suggests this
should be confined to times when a corporation is owned by "enemies" of a state
who wish to confiscate it. O'CONNELL, supra note 68, at 1042.
83. For siege social, see O'CONNELL, supra note 68, at 1041; BROWNLIE, supra
note 66, at 474.
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without incorporation will normally be insufficient to confer
nationality. Under established international law, as long as a
subsidiary and its parent operate as "different legal per-
sons," 4 the subsidiary, as an independent entity operating
separately with its own seat of business, will be considered a
national of its state of incorporation and fall within the juris-
diction of its incorporating state."
There are situations when no genuine links exist between
the subsidiary and the country in which it is located.86 Barce-
lona Traction acknowledges that situation. However, the Bar-
celona Traction court stated that because there are as yet no
accepted international rules to deal with these situations, the
court would not make any conclusions about the absence of
links." This decision appears to reinforce the international
law tenet of corporate separation between parent and subsid-
iary.88
84. SCIDIrrrHOFF, supra note 53, at 321; see supra note 56.
85. Conversely, when there is no act of incorporation, as in the case of the
establishment of a branch or agency by a parent corporation, then there is much
less likelihood of the host state being able to claim jurisdiction over the branch or
agency. The branch or agency remains an "arm" of the parent corporation and
under the jurisdiction of the state having jurisdiction over the parent corporation.
SCHMITMOFF, supra note 53, at 318. Of course, in the case of wrongdoing by a
branch, the law allows the host state to reach the parent company. See supra note
56 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), made a clear distinction between subsidiaries
incorporated abroad and companies not so incorporated, stating that because the
Japanese-owned subsidiary, Sumitomo, was " 'constituted under the applicable laws
and regulations' of New York . . . it is a company of the United States, not a
company of Japan." Id. at 182 (quoting the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaty between the United States and Japan). The Court then compared Sumitom-
o's legal status with that of "companies of Japan operating in the United States."
Id. at 183. These companies, i.e., branches and agencies, were not considered com-
panies of the United States and thus did not fall under United States jurisdiction.
86. An example might be a subsidiary established to function only as a mid-
point through which goods pass on their way to a third country. See infra note
167.
87. Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 47 (Feb. 5). In some situations, however, treaty provisions
between the two states involved will cover such circumstances. Id.
88. "The decision [to make no distinctions between subsidiaries with links and
those without] thus constitutes a further instance of the tendency to respect the
corporate veil even in circumstances where such respect appears to be at variance
with economic realities." SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 56, at 12.
Some commentators have questioned whether jurisdiction premised on incor-
poration gives too much weight to the act of incorporation. See Thompson, supra
note 18, at 391-92. Thompson notes that a host state should not be able to force
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The actual practice of states confirms acceptance of the act
of incorporation as the primary factor in determining nationali-
ty. This is most clearly seen in the many modern treaties that
define "nationals" to include corporations. 9 The existence of
these treaties lends further weight to the customary interna-
tional rule that corporate nationality is determined primarily
through the act of incorporation.
D. The Validity of the Cuban Democracy Act
1. Testing the Validity of Asserting Jurisdiction over Foreign-
Incorporated American Subsidiaries under International Law
The Cuban Democracy Act, similar to other United States
foreign policy trade embargoes, claims the authority to regu-
late foreign-based subsidiaries owned or controlled by Ameri-
can corporations." The question is whether there is a basis in
international law to make such a claim. The answer can be
found by testing the Act under each of the previously discussed
bases of jurisdiction: territoriality, nationality, passive person-
ality, universality, protection, and the effects doctrine.9
The principle of territoriality does not, of course, apply in
this situation. The Cuban Democracy Act is concerned with
regulating subsidiary corporations located and incorporated
the parent corporation to forego all regulation of its foreign-based subsidiary where
there is a clear national interest of the parent state involved. A state may, for
example, require in-state incorporation in order to control use of it own natural
and human resources. Thompson, supra note 18, at 392. Thompson's concerns are
important, but they could be satisfied by the application of international jurisdic-
tional principles and the use of "reasonableness" to determine whether the parent
corporation's state should be allowed prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction. For
further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
89. BROWNLIE, supra note 66, at 409. See CASTEL, supra note 76, at 132-33
(noting that many United States friendship treaties state that subsidiary corpora-
tions are to be considered nationals of their state of incorporation). Examples of
such treaties include the treaty of commerce between the United Kingdom and
Iran which defines corporations incorporated within the state as being nationals,
and the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community, which
provides that companies are considered to be nationals if incorporated and having
their administration centrale within the state. BROWNLIE, supra note 66, at 409-10.
See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 (1982) (holding
that the friendship and commerce treaty between the United States and Japan
states that a Japanese subsidiary incorporated in New York "is a company of the
United States").
90. See infra text accompanying notes 107-11.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 60-70.
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outside United States territory. Thus, the basis for the Act's
jurisdiction will have to be found in a principle of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction.
The nationality principle may appear to offer a basis of
jurisdiction. According to the language of the Cuban Democra-
cy Act, "United States person" means United States citizens
and permanent residents and organizations "organized under
the laws of the United States."92 This language would suggest
that the Cuban Democracy Act claims jurisdiction based on
nationality.93  However, the Act's amendment of section
515.559 of the CACRs94 revoking the ability of American-
owned, foreign-based subsidiaries to obtain a license to trade
with Cuba is explicitly intended to affect the activity of com-
panies not incorporated under United States law."5 As previ-
ously discussed, and affirmed by the Restatement (Third), na-
tionality cannot be extended to those corporations incorporated
under the laws of foreign states." Therefore, the validity of
applying the Cuban Democracy Act to foreign-based subsidiar-
ies cannot be based on the principle of nationality.
The protective principle, which offers a basis of jurisdiction
if the security of a state is threatened,97 is not useful in this
situation since the activity of foreign subsidiaries trading with
92. 22 U.S.C. § 6010 (Supp. IV 1988).
93. The nationality principle is frequently applied in the areas of trade policy
and export controls. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS, supra
note 76, at 37.
94. 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1988).
95. The Cuban Democracy Act is explicitly directed toward subsidiaries. It
therefore does not affect foreign branches or agencies of American corporations.
These entities, legally recognized as extensions of the parent- corporation, are for-
bidden to trade with Cuba under the CACRs, the previously existing regulations
that affect United States domestic trade with Cuba. For the CACRs, see supra
notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
96. "For purposes of international law, a corporation has the nationality of the
state under the laws of which the corporation is organized." RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 49, § 213. See discussion supra, notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
The Restatement (Third) does not recognize that a state has jurisdiction simply
because a corporation is "owned" by its nationals. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 49, § 414 cmt. e. Furthermore, if one uses either of the accepted tests of a
corporation's nationality, i.e., whether the subsidiary is incorporated in the United
States or has its "seat" inside the United States, it is clear that a foreign-incorpo-
rated subsidiary is not an American national and the Act cannot be justified by
using the nationality principle. Extraterritorial Application of EAA, supra note 62,
at 1323-24.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 402(3) & cmt. f.
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Cuba do not pose a security threat to the United States."
Their trade may lessen the impact of the embargo, but that is
a foreign policy issue, not one of security. The trade of foreign-
based subsidiaries did not pose a threat from 1975 to 1992, the
years in which the CACRs allowed foreign-based subsidiaries
to trade with Cuba prior to the passage of the Cuban Democra-
cy Act. Nothing has changed, except that Cuba has lost its
former support from the Soviet Union. There is no security
threat, and therefore the protective principle cannot be used to
assert jurisdiction.
The effects principle may appear to offer a basis of juris-
diction since it pertains to actions conducted outside the Unit-
ed States s and could therefore apply to trade between foreign
subsidiaries and Cuba. According to the Restatement (Third),
which differs from the standard accepted in international law,
in order for the United States to exert jurisdiction based on the
effects doctrine, there must be conduct outside the United
States which "has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory."' 0 Thus, the question becomes whether
foreign subsidiaries trading with Cuba will cause a substantial
effect in the United States. However, there is no effect on do-
mestic trade or on the welfare of American citizens, two tests
that American courts have used.1"1 Indeed, the only effect of
98. Furthermore, there are no allegations of espionage, counterfeiting, falsifica-
tion of official documents, peijury before consular officials, or conspiracy to violate
customs or immigrations laws, the other possible reasons for use of the protective
principle according to the Restatement (Third). RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
49, § 402 cmt. f.
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49 § 402(1)(c).
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 402(1)(c) (emphasis added). This
standard is the looser American version. The established international law stan-
dard requires both substantial and intentional effect. See supra note 69 for discus-
sion of the differences between the United States and other countries when apply-
ing the effects doctrine.
It must be noted that because of these differences, the United States has
claimed jurisdiction based on "effects," particularly in antitrust cases, when other
countries might not have. BROWNLIE, supra note 66, at 300. The United States
has somewhat tempered this broad jurisdiction by use of the Restatement (Third)'s
"reasonableness" test. See supra note 70. However, as noted infra note 170, United
States courts appear nonetheless to lean very favorably in the direction of finding
jurisdiction, which suggests that a balancing test of reasonableness may be limited
in its usefulness.
101. See United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing with
approval the Comprehensive Drug Abuse & Prevention And Control Act of 1970,
21 U.S.C.A. § 801 (West 1980), which states that the importing and distribution of
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continued trade with Cuba by subsidiaries may be that the
United States might change its perceptions of its foreign policy
goals due to its failure to influence foreign-based subsidiary
trade with Cuba."2 If one applies the international law defi-
nition of the effects doctrine, it is not at all obvious that such
an effect can be termed "substantial." If there is a substantial
effect by the trading with Cuba, that effect will take place
primarily within Cuba."3
The intentionality of the subsidiaries to produce an effect
within the United States should also be examined.0 4 It can
controlled substances illegally has "substantial" and detrimental effect on the
American people); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (1945) (conspiracy to create aluminum cartel impacts substantially on Ameri-
can commerce); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 (1975)
(defendants' fraudulent foreign securities transactions relating to a Canadian for-
estry complex had no known impact on either the domestic investing public or
domestic securities markets, even though the Americans involved may have com-
mitted various miscellaneous acts in the United States in furtherance of the
scheme); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr. Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40
(1955) (compelling of American companies by Swiss organizations to restrict manu-
facture and export of American watches intentionally affects American commerce);
United States v. Holophane Co. Inc., 119 F. Supp. 114 (1954) (conspiracy by
French, English, and American companies to control manufacturing and sale of
prismatic materials was restraint in trade); BROWNLIE, supra note 66, at 300. For
further discussion of intentionality, see infra note 104.
102. Extraterritorial Application of EAA, supra note 62, at 1328.
103. It is instructive to look at Judgment of Sept. 17, 1982 (Compagnie
Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.), District Court at the
Hague reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983), a case to determine whether the Nether-
lands or the United States had jurisdiction over an American-owned subsidiary
incorporated in the Netherlands. The subsidiary had declared it was obliged to
support an American boycott of the Soviet Union and thus could not ship products
destined for that country, breaking a contractual agreement with a French compa-
ny. The court, in examining the effects principle, concluded that lilt cannot, how-
ever, be seen how the export to Russia of goods not originating in the United
States by a non-American exporter could have any direct and illicit effects within
the United States." Id. at 73. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes
115, 164.
104. "Intentionality" can also be inferred from the nature of the actions. See
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945), the case that
first clearly articulated the effects doctrine, in which the foreign defendants were
accused of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act by setting up and executing an
international aluminum cartel abroad that, by its very nature, was intended to
adversely impact United States commerce. See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 693-94 (1962) (establishing a monopoly of
99% of all ferrovanadium and 90% of all vanadium oxide produced in this country
was intended to eliminate other producers and distributors). For examples of cases
where the courts specifically required some kind of intent, and some that did not
so require, see Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws:
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be assumed that subsidiaries that trade do so purposefully, but
it is not at all clear that they would trade with Cuba with the
intention of impacting on the United States. Their intent is
more likely related to the making of profits. Thus, if there was
no intent to have an effect in the United States, and if any
realized effect is insubstantial, the effects doctrine will not
support United States jurisdiction over the subsidiary."5
The universality principle is obviously not applicable in
this situation. A subsidiary's trade with Cuba cannot be
termed an offense "recognized by the community of nations as
of universal concern."' ° Similarly, trading with Cuba by sub-
sidiaries does not create an American "victim," which would be
necessary in order for the passive personality principle to be
used. Thus, the Cuban Democracy Act's extraterritorial fea-
tures do not pass muster under any of the international law
principles of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the United States as-
serts that it does have jurisdiction over American-owned or
controlled foreign-based subsidiaries.
2. United States Justifications for Asserting Jurisdiction over
Foreign-Incorporated Subsidiaries
In spite of the seeming lack of a basis in international law
to justify its assertion of jurisdiction, the United States asserts
that it has jurisdiction and will enforce the Act against non-
complying American foreign-based subsidiaries. Its position is
derived from the Constitution, which gives the United States
Congress the right to regulate commerce,' 7 a power that
Congress interprets broadly."0 ' Of course, as a member of the
The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 9
n.44 (1992).
105. Of course, were a case to arise under the Cuban Democracy Act in United
States courts, the Act would probably not be deemed unconstitutional. See infra
notes 163-65 and accompanying text. The United States might try to show that
violations of the Act constituted an impact on foreign policy that is substantial, if
not intentional. Were this argument to prevail, it would highlight the differences
between the American and international understandings of the elements needed to
establish jurisdiction under the effects doctrine.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 404. Such universal concerns in-
clude piracy, slave trade, hijacking, genocide, and war crimes. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 49, § 404.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
108. An example of the breadth of Congressional power in the area of foreign
trade is that of its asserted ability to regulate trade. By law, there is no inherent
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international community, the United States also includes cus-
tomary international law as a part of its law, and the United
States will usually follow those principles.0 9 However, the
United States has also reserved the right to differ from inter-
national law. The Supreme Court has stated that the United
States may pass laws or judicial decisions that are not in ac-
cord with international law; those laws will nonetheless be
given authority within the United States."0 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has noted that in the realm of foreign policy in
particular, the federal government has wide latitude and is not
restricted to the Constitution's enumerated powers."'
These justifications, of course, are all domestically orient-
ed; that is, they explain United States law to United States
enforcers and courts. The United States must also justify its
broad policies to the international community. In examining
United States practice, it appears that the United States is
attempting to create either another principle of jurisdiction, or
an expanded definition of the nationality principle. The United
States appears to believe it can assert jurisdiction over entities
that are "controlled""' by United States "persons.""' To
"control" a foreign-incorporated subsidiary means that a parent
corporation owns either a majority or a substantial block of the
voting shares of the subsidiary corporation and no other entity
owns a comparable block." 4 Thus, a foreign-based subsidiary
right to export, and all such trade is prohibited unless a license for export has
been issued by the Department of Commerce. 15 C.F.R. § 770.3 (1993). Licensing,
of course, is premised on enforcement jurisdiction. Schachter, supra note 59, at
249.
109. "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and admin-
istered by the courts . . . ." The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899).
110. When a "controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision" exists,
it will have precedence over the customary international law. Id. at 700; see also
JANIS, supra note 49, at 102 ("international common law plainly has no more su-
premacy than do treaties; that is, statutes later in time prevail").
111. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 316-18 (1936).
The president in particular has been acknowledged as having powers that are very
broad in the realm of international relations. Id. at 319-21.
112. Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterri-
torial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1317 (1985) [hereinafter Predictability
and Comity]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 414 cmt. e (declar-
ing that control is a sufficient basis to exercise jurisdiction).
113. Remember that "United States person" is often defined, as for instance in
the CACRs, to include corporations and other organizations. 31 C.F.R. § 515.329
(1993).
114. CASTEL, supra note 76, at 176 n.456.
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owned or controlled by an American corporation should, under
the United States viewpoint, fall under the jurisdiction of Unit-
ed States law.
However, this principle of control is not yet accepted in
international law. Although control is considered a "link" in
international law that helps establish a relationship between
the state and the subsidiary corporation, absent the act of
incorporation, control is not enough in itself to confer jurisdic-
tion.' Additionally, the use of control to determine national-
ity conflicts with the principle, articulated in Barcelona Trac-
tion, that nationality is derived from either incorporation or
the seat of activities." 6
In conclusion, the United States will not be able to justify
the jurisdictional basis of the Cuban Democracy Act because
the Act applies to companies incorporated in other countries.
Furthermore, because it cannot successfully justify the premise
of the Act, the United States will have difficulties enforcing the
Act.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT
A. Enforcement
The CACRs, the overall regulatory scheme affecting Unit-
ed States interactions with Cuba,"7 have established the pro-
cedures to be followed when there is a presumed violation of
115. See Judgment of Sept. 17, 1982 (Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A.
v. Sensor Nederland B.v.), District Court at the Hague reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 66
(1983), a case which grew out of a contract dispute between a Netherlands-based
American subsidiary and a French company. The United States had declared that
no American-owned or controlled foreign-based subsidiary could involve itself in
any transactions that had to do with the Soviet Union, in particular with its pro-
ject to build a trans-Siberian pipeline for natural gas. The Netherlands-based
American subsidiary, Sensor, had contracted with a French corporation to deliver
gas equipment that would have then been shipped to the pipeline production.
After the embargo was announced, Sensor attempted to break its contract. The
Hague court used the Barcelona Traction test of incorporation or place of business,
and the international law principles of jurisdiction to decide that Sensor was not
an American national, not under American jurisdiction for purposes of the embar-
go, and therefore incorrect in refusing to deliver the equipment. See also infra
note 164. But see SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 56, at 8-9, 21, 27 (stating that
control is a sufficient link to establish nationality, although acknowledging that
Barcelona Traction does not agree).
116. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
117. See supra part II.A.2.
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the Cuban trade embargo."8 These procedures include the
issuing by the Treasury Department's OFAC of a pre-penalty
notice,"' the right of the subsidiary to make a written reply
or request a hearing within thirty days, 20 and its right to ju-
dicial review.'2' Should the subsidiary not pay the penalty
imposed within thirty days, the matter is referred for adminis-
trative collection measures or to the Department of Justice to
recover the penalty in a civil suit in a federal district court.
22
The penalties can be severe. 2 '
However, the question remains as to whether the penalties
can ever be enforced. The Cuban Democracy Act, without pre-
scriptive jurisdiction, will face difficulties because there can be
no effective enforcement scheme. Enforcement is essentially a
territorially based phenomenon. While a state may attempt to
118. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.702-.707 (1993) (penalty procedures).
119. This notice will designate the possible fine to be imposed and whether or
not there may be forfeiture of future licenses. 31 C.F.R. § 515.702(a), (b) (1993).
The penalties are those imposed by the TWEA. 31 C.F.R. § 515.701(a) (1993). See
infra note 123 for the relevant language of the TWEA.
120. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.702(b)(2), 515.703(a), 515.704(a) (1993).
121. 31 C.F.R. § 515.706 (1993). Judicial review is that provided under 5
U.S.C. § 702. Id.
122. 31 C.F.R. § 515.707 (1993).
123. The Cuban Democracy Act employs the same penalties that are imposed
for violations of the TWEA. The TWEA states in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this Act . . .
shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $1,000,000, or if a natural
person, be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned for not more
than ten years or both; and the officer, director, or agent of any corpora-
tion who knowingly participants [sic] in such violation shall, upon convic-
tion, be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned for not more than
ten years or both.
(b)(1) The Secretary of the Treasury may impose a civil penalty of not
more than $50,000 on any person who violates any license, order, rule, or
regulation issued under this Act ....
(c) Upon conviction, any property, funds, securities, papers, or other arti-
cles or documents, or any vessel, together with tackle, apparel, furniture,
and equipment, concerned in any violation of subsection (a) may be for-
feited to the United States ....
50 U.S.C. app. § 16(a)-(c) (Supp. IV 1988).
A person can violate the Cuban Democracy Act by trading without a li-
cense. If the goods are non-American, that is, they do not involve American tech-
nology or materials, the person will have violated the CACRs. If the goods are
American, then the person may also have violated the EARs. Violation of the
CACRs, including the Cuban Democracy Act, involves fines, normally up to
$50,000 in civil penalties. 31 C.F.R. § 515.701(3) (1993). Violation of the EARs
might also include suspension, revocation, or denial of export privileges. 15 C.F.R.
§ 787.1(b)(1) (1993).
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extend its laws extraterritorially, unless it has valid jurisdic-
tion it will be unable to enforce these measures by punitive
actions against an entity located outside of its territory and
beyond its reach. 124 Thus, the United States may choose to
legislate extraterritorial export controls such as the Cuban
Democracy Act; however, when these controls conflict with the
laws of a foreign state, according to international law they
cannot be enforced.
125
Nonetheless, it appears that many foreign-based firms
comply with United States embargoes and seem to hold them-
selves accountable to the United States. Over the years, the
United States has used different mechanisms to ensure compli-
ance, including informal means of persuading the parent cor-
poration to regulate its foreign-incorporated subsidiary,126
124. Enforcement within a foreign state requires that the law being enforced
has international validity, meaning that the enforcing state has recognized pre-
scriptive jurisdiction. Schachter, supra note 59, at 249. If that condition is met,
then the states involved have concurrent jurisdiction. However, according to the
Restatement (Third), even if jurisdiction exists, a state may not exercise it if such
exercise would be unreasonable, based on an evaluation of relevant factors. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 403 (1)-(2) (1987). For the list of relevant
factors contained in § 403(2), see supra, note 70. If it is agreed by both states
that it would not be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction, then the "host" state will
allow the "enforcing" state to carry out its legal procedures.
The principles of international comity may also be relied on by two states
in order to carry out judicial cooperation. Comity has been defined as "the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). Alter-
natively, two states may have entered into a treaty that encompasses particular
jurisdictional actions; the most common example of which is treaties of extradition
for specified criminal activities. See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th
Cir. 1986) (murder of a London police constable), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
125. DE MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 8, at 254. For example,
Minnesota-based Cargill Inc., one of the world's largest agricultural companies is
known to have traded with Cuba without the necessary licenses but will probably
never face charges because its trading was done through a Swiss subsidiary. Dean
Baquet, U.S. Companies Use Affiliates Abroad to Skirt Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
27, 1993, at Al, D3.
The results of the United States embargo against Libya also exposes the
inability of the United States to assert jurisdiction when it lacks the necessary
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. In 1987, the Treasury Department re-
ported that, despite the embargo which is similar to that against Cuba, there were
169 foreign subsidiaries of 80 United States corporations doing at least $266 mil-
lion in trade with Libya. Baquet, supra at D3. In reality, the United States has
had to give tacit approval to this trade because there is no way to enforce the
trade ban.
126. Earlier United States embargoes, although they theoretically applied to
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"blacklisting" subsidiary corporations from further trading
privileges with any domestic American firm,127 and claiming
jurisdiction over American directors of foreign-based subsidiar-
ies.128 These actions violate or test the limits of customary
international law, and these tactics are today seldom if ever
used officially.
Foreign states have generally attempted to accommodate
intrusive United States laws, so long as they feel their sover-
eignty is not overtly threatened.'29 However, underlying dif-
ferences between the United States and other nations concern-
ing the jurisdictional principles have never disappeared. The
foreign subsidiaries, were actually enforced against the parent company by 'infor-
mal" means. Thompson, supra note 18, at 328 (discussing the embargoes affecting
Southeast Asia enacted in the 1960s and 1970s). While the practice of holding the
parent corporation responsible for the actions of its subsidiary is less directly con-
frontational with the foreign country, it is still violative of international law be-
cause the parent will probably attempt to force the subsidiary to comply with the
American policy, even though the subsidiary's state of incorporation may not agree
with that policy or want its nationals to comply. The practice is a less than satis-
factory solution to the problem of extraterritorial regulation.
127. A United States foreign subsidiary found in violation of a trade regulation
can be barred from trading with any United States corporation. Thompson, supra
note 18, at 328 n.34. This, however, is not part of the CACRs.
128. The United States might attempt to claim jurisdiction over American di-
rectors of foreign-based subsidiaries who are responsible for the actions of the
corporations. However, this also does not resolve the problem. While these individ-
uals would most likely be American nationals, under the corporations laws of most
European countries, the affirmative duty of directors is "to carry out their func-
tions in the best interests of their company. Any actions which they may take at
the direction of the controlling shareholders contrary to the interests of the sub-
sidiary could subject them to civil actions by creditors, employees or minority
shareholders, and possibly even to criminal proceedings." Harold H. Tittmann,
Extraterritorial Application to U.S. Export Control Laws on Foreign Subsidiaries of
U.S. Corporations: An American Lawyer's View from Europe, 16 INT' LAW. 730,
735-36 (1982). Thus, the foreign corporation would be caught between two
countries' laws.
129. This undoubtedly explains why, for instance, other nations allow corpo-
rations owned and controlled by American nationals but incorporated in their terri-
tory, to still apply to the United States Commerce Department in order to obtain
a license to trade with a third country. A Canadian official described this
"gentlemen's agreement" that had evolved between Canada and the United States
concerning Cuba: "When the licensing procedure was in place, it allowed the Cana-
dian and American governments to continue to disagree on the principles of juris-
dictional reach, while permitting Canadian-based subsidiaries to trade with Cuba."
LEGAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE, SOME EXAMPLES OF CURRENT ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO CANADA, 1, 14 (1993) (on file with the Brooklyn
Journal of International Law).
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passage of the Cuban Democracy Act has exacerbated the dif-
ferences. It appears that the Act is a law that other states do
not wish to accommodate, as the international reaction to its
passage demonstrates.
B. International Reaction
1. International Condemnation
Within a matter of weeks following the passage and sign-
ing into law of the Cuban Democracy Act, the United Nations
General Assembly passed a resolution by an overwhelming
majority... to rebuke member states whose laws apply
extraterritorially."3' The resolution, sponsored by Cuba,"'
was understood to be a response to the passage of the Cuban
Democracy Act."' Many nations that usually align them-
selves with the United States in matters before the United
Nations either voted for the resolution or abstained from vot-
ing." 4 The votes in favor of the resolution, as well as many of
130. Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Im-
posed by the United States of America Against Cuba, G.A. Res. 47/19, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., Agenda Item 39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/19 (1993) [hereinafter Necessity of
Ending the Embargo]. The vote, taken on November 24, 1992, was 59-3, with 71
abstentions. Stanley Meisler, U.N. Rebuffs U.S. on Cuba Embargo Trade, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992, at 1A. Resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding,
unlike those passed by the United Nations Security Council. UNITED NATIONS
DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, 14, 16 (10th ed.
1986).
131. The Resolution does not mention the United States by name. Its preamble
expresses concern for "the promulgation and application by Member States of laws
and regulations whose extraterritorial effects affect the sovereignty of other States
and the legitimate interests of entities or persons under their jurisdiction . . . "
and calls on all nations to "refrain from promulgating and applying" such laws "in
conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and in-
ternational law .. . ." Necessity of Ending the Embargo, supra note 130, at 1.
132. The Cuban ambassador, Alcibiades Hidalgo Basulto, told the United Na-
tions General Assembly that the United States embargo was an attempt "to im-
pose upon the Cuban people a political, social and economic system to the liking
of the United States." Meisler, supra note 130, at IA.
133. A cursory scanning of newspaper headlines attests to this. See, e.g.,
Meisler, supra note 130, at IA; Frank J. Prial, U.N. Votes to Urge U.S. to Dis-
mantle Embargo on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992, at Al; UN Votes Against
U.S. on Embargo of Cuba, CI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1992, at 1.
134. The only countries voting against the Resolution were the United States,
Israel, and Romania. The vote was "almost bizarre" for a United Nations resolu-
tion since those in favor included communist countries such as Vietnam and North
Korea, North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, Latin American friends of the
United States, and developing world governments such as Nigeria and Kenya, as
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the abstentions, illustrated the concern and disagreement with
United States foreign policy.'35 For example, a high-ranking
United Nations diplomat representing Great Britain, a country
that abstained from voting on the resolution, stated that the
new United States embargo was "a violation of a general prin-
ciple of international law and the sovereignty of independent
nations.""6 Mexico's foreign relations secretary called the Act
an affront to Mexican sovereignty.13 Uruguayan and Vene-
zuelan legislators declared that the Act interferes with their
commercial affairs."' New Zealand, a country which voted in
favor of the resolution, did so because "there is an important
underlying principle at stake... [C]ountries such as our own
must be able to go about their ordinary trade and commercial
business free from the extraterritorial reach of legislation im-
posed unilaterally by third countries."139
International disagreement has not lessened with the
passage of time. 40 The European Communities Parliament
well as American enemies such as Iraq. Countries voting in favor of the Resolu-
tion included Brazil, Canada, France, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Spain, and
Venezuela. The countries of the European Community abstained, as did Armenia,
Great Britain, Italy, Russia, Rwanda, and Zaire. Representatives from forty-two
countries failed to show up for the vote. Meisler, supra note 130, at 1A; see also
Prial, supra note 133, at Al.
According to one report, most of the United States allies who abstained or
voted for the Resolution did so both because it was nonbinding and could give
expression to their anger at the extraterritorial nature of the Cuban Democracy
Act. Prial, supra note 133. It appears that the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War has allowed traditional American allies to vote or abstain
with the confidence that they can rebuke an ally, or not support its actions, with-
out sparking an international crisis or tipping the East-West balance. Prial, supra
note 133.
135. See Prial, supra note 133, at Al; UN Votes against U.S. on Embargo of
Cuba, supra note 133, at 1.
136. Prial, supra note 133, at Al.
137. David Clark Scott, The World From ... Mexico City, CHRISTIAN SCO. MON-
ITOR, Oct. 28, 1992, at 3.
138. Id.
139. Permanent Representative Terence O'Brien, Statement Before United Na-
tions General Assembly Vote by New Zealand (Nov. 24, 1992) (on file with the
Brooklyn Journal of International Law). The statement notes that New Zealand
would have preferred a resolution solely on the extraterritorial issue, rather than
on "certain extraneous material." Id.
140. Domestically, calls for the Act's change or repeal began within weeks of
its passage. A bill was introduced in the House in the late spring of 1993 to end
the trade embargo. Christopher Marquis, Activists Turn D.C. into a Soapbox as
Fight over Cuba Policy Intensifies, MIAMI HERALD, May 24, 1993, at 1A. "Promi-
nent lawmakers" and Cuba experts began to voice concern that current United
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adopted a resolution in December 1992 that called on the Unit-
ed States to repeal the Act because it "constitutes a violation of
international law on free trade and transit, going against the
principles of the EC-US declaration .... ,,4 At the Ibero-
American summit held in Brazil in July 1993, the heads of
state in attendance condemned the United States for the em-
bargo.14 1 In September 1993, the European Communities Par-
liament adopted another, fuller resolution calling on the Unit-
ed States to end the embargo.14 1 In November 1993, the Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly passed yet another resolution
condemning the United States for its actions in Cuba.' The
international community has clearly remained concerned about
the United States policy, 45 and a primary reason for its dis-
States policy will do little to avert a possibly violent transition in Cuba. Asked
one senator, "How can we help Cuba avoid catastrophe during and after Castro's
downfall--catastrophe in the form of starvation or disease epidemic or mass migra-
tion to the U.S. or civil war?" Christopher Marquis, Cuba's Reforms Called Too
Weak, MIAMI HERALD, July 30, 1993, at 12A (quoting Senator Robert Kerrey of
Nebraska).
141. Parliament Resolution on Int'l Trade Restrictions by the U.S. (Cuban De-
mocracy Act), 1993 O.J. (C 21), reprinted in 25 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNiTIES 130 (1992).
142. Andres Oppenheimer, Four Reasons for Summit Resolution, MIAMI HERALD,
July 19, 1993, at 8A. According to Oppenheimer, the language of this statement
was similar to the November 1992 UN General Assembly Resolution. See Necessity
of Ending the Embargo, supra note 130.
143. Parliament Resolution on the Embargo Against Cuba and the Toricelli Act
1993 O.J. (C 268), reprinted in 26 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COM-
MISSION 64 (1993). The Parliament also advocated more dialogue between Cuba
and the Community, and suggested that Cuba be made eligible for Community-
financed regional cooperation programmes geared toward the Caribbean and Latin
America. Id.
144. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution by an 88-4 vote with Alba-
nia, Israel, Paraguay, and the United States voting against it. There were 57
abstentions. "It is hard to recall a comparable humiliation for American diploma-
cy." The Hammer that Failed on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1993, at 15A.
145. One commentator who supports the embargo suggests that the issue is not
really "sovereignty," but rather that countries protesting United States actions
oppose anything that will "disrupt their exploiting--on the backs of the Cuban
people, of course-Fidel Castro's current survival strategy of luring Western ex-
ports and investment to Cuba on attractive terms." Jose R. Cardenas, Why Our
Allies are Wrong on Cuba Trade Issue, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 11, 1992, at 5M.
Cardenas is undoubtedly correct, at least in part. Individuals and businesses do
sense potential economic opportunity in Cuba. Cuba is the largest one-island con-
sumer market in the Caribbean, a market that has long been isolated from normal
trade. John D. Harbron, U.S. Embargo on Cuba: It's Hurting U.S. Firms, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 28, 1993, at 9A. Indeed, the Cuban-American National Foundation,
which had helped draft the Cuban Democracy Act, has itself commissioned "an
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approval of the United States actions concerning Cuba is that
the actions disregard customary international law principles.
2. The Use of Blocking Statutes
Many countries, in response to the implementation of the
Cuban Democracy Act, have responded with a legal mecha-
nism, the blocking statute. These statutes in essence void the
impact of the Act for all nationals within the territory of the
particular country and penalize those within the territory who
adhere to the Act. Fourteen countries have enacted such legis-
lation in response to the Cuban Democracy Act. 4' The Act
has no legal effect within these fourteen countries. These
blocking statutes exploit the fact that the territorial state has
both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over the person,
while the state relying upon other bases of jurisdiction has, at
most, only prescriptive jurisdiction. "7
Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
(FEMA)'48 is typical of these blocking orders. FEMA was de-
signed primarily as a defense to requests by other countries for
record production in antitrust proceedings.' FEMA can also
be used in situations when Canada feels a country is infringing
on its sovereignty.15 When the Cuban Democracy Act was
elaborate economic blueprint for post-Castro Cuba, and a prestigious Washington
law firm has held jampacked seminars on preparing to invest in Cuba." Pamela
Constable, New Voices of Exile, BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 1993, (Sunday Magazine),
at 10. Nonetheless, this does not negate the international law question of the right
of the United States to prescribe to companies incorporated in other countries to
whom they can and cannot ship.
146. The countries involved are Canada, Japan, and the twelve members of the
European Community. Russell Warren Howe, supra note 28, at C3.
147. The effectiveness of blocking statutes is another example of the dominance
of the territorial principle over all extraterritorial principles. DE MESTRAL &
GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 8, at 40. There are at least eighteen states that
have blocking legislation. DE MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIEESKI, supra note 8, at
39-40 (noting that some statutes give great discretion to the government to inter-
vene on a case-by-case basis,, while others detail specific interests the state wishes
to protect). For examples of blocking statutes, see A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION 79-225 (1983).
148. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA), R.S.C. ch. F-29 (1985)
(Can.). "Canadians are now increasingly concerned with the burgeoning of extra-
territorial intent in U.S. laws and with the expansion of claims to extraterritorial
jurisdiction by U.S. regulatory bodies." Allan E. Gotlieb, The Legal Aspects of In-
ternational Investment: The Canada-U.S. Experience, 76 AM. SOCY1 INT'L L. 47, 51
(1982).
149. See FEMA, R.S.C. ch. F-29 (Introduction) (1985) (Can.).
150. FEMA states in pertinent part:
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passed, Canada passed its 1992 FEMA Order to be applied
specifically against the American Act. It "bars compliance with
the application in Canada of the United States measure pro-
hibiting trade with Cuba, and requires these businesses to
report to the Attorney General of Canada, and not comply
with, any directions given by persons in a position to influence
their decisions in this regard." 5' Penalties for failure to re-
port or comply to the FEMA order include fines and possible
prison sentences.'52
As the Canadian Act demonstrates, the blocking statute is
a powerful weapon. Foreign nations learned of its utility after
the United States imposed widely unpopular extraterritorial
measures in 1982 as part of its embargo against the Soviet
Union for that country's imposition of military law in Poland.
The embargo caused international turmoil because the United
States attempted to forbid American, American-owned subsid-
A. Where, in the opinion of the Attorney General of Canada, a foreign
state or foreign tribunal has taken or is proposing or is likely to take
measures affecting international trade or commerce of a kind or in a
manner that has adversely affected or is likely to adversely affect signifi-
cant Canadian interests in relation to international trade or commerce
involving business carried on in whole or in part in Canada or that oth-
erwise has infringed or is likely to infringe Canadian sovereignty, the
Attorney General of Canada may . ..
(a)require any person in Canada to give notice to him of such measures,
or of any directives, instructions, intimations of policy or other communi-
cations relating to such measures from a person who is in a position to
direct or influence the policies of the person in Canada; or
(b)prohibit any person in Canada from complying with such measures, or
with any directives, instructions, intimations of policy or other communi-
cations relating to such measures from a person who is in a position to
direct or influence the policies of the person in Canada.
FEMA, R.S.C. ch. F-29, § 5(1) (1985). "Measures taken" by a foreign state include
"laws . . . to be made by the foreign state . . . ." Id. § 5(2).
151. SOR/92-584, Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order of
1992, 126 Can. Gaz. 4048, 4050 (1992).
152. Maximum penalties are $10,000, with an additional or alternative penalty
of up to five years in prison. Id. at 4052. As of September 1993, the Canadian
Justice Department was investigating about twenty American subsidiaries for pos-
sible violations of FEMA. Peter Benesh, Canada Takes Advantage of Embargo
Against Cuba, MIAMl HERALD, Sept. 5, 1993, at 1K. It can only be assumed that
any American-owned subsidiary under investigation by Canada has either overtly
halted exports or has discontinued documented plans concerning trade with Cuba
due to the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act. Otherwise, it appears that it will
be very difficult for Canada to prove that a corporation's actions were due to the
Cuban Democracy Act, rather than to an exercise of ordinary business judgment.
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iary, and European companies from honoring contract obliga-
tions having to do with the building of the Soviet trans-Siberi-
an pipeline. 153 Several countries refused either to join in the
embargo or to allow its implementation. 5 4 The United King-
dom enjoined its nationals, including American-owned subsid-
iaries, from participating in the embargo. When the United
States then issued sanctions against several British companies,
the United Kingdom, in a burst of inspiration, invoked its
blocking legislation, the Protection of Trading Interests Act of
1980, as a defensive legal move to protect its nationals.'55
Because a nation's blocking statute essentially allows it to
bar the application of another country's law, the effect is to
nullify the foreign state's action. As such, an international
equilibrium of sorts is maintained. However, blocking statutes
are not a panacea. Their implementation makes a strong state-
ment on the part of the blocking state against the laws and
policies of the other state. While not a slap in the face, they
certainly cause international embarrassment, and thus are not
used lightly. Furthermore, when a country employs a blocking
statute, it creates legal difficulties for any subsidiaries incorpo-
rated within its territory whose parent corporations exist in
the state whose legislation has been blocked.
153. The 1982 embargo was authorized by the 1979 EAA. The EAA was
amended so that foreign-based American subsidiaries could not export even com-
pletely foreign-origin equipment or technology to the Soviet Union or to any third
country dealing with the pipeline. If a foreign company had United States tech-
nological information, it was to apply for a license from the Commerce Department
before it could re-export anything using that information. DE MESTRAL &
GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 8, at 201-02 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 27,251 (1982)).
For discussion of the 1982 embargo, see Homer E. Moyer, Jr. & Linda A. Mabry,
Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, &
Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases 15 LAW & POLY INTL BuS. 1, 60-92 (1983).
154. France invoked its requisition law in order to enforce all contracts with
the Soviet Union, despite the American embargo. John Ellicott, Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Export Controls-The Siberian Pipeline, 77 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
241, 262, 264 (1983).
155. The British Act provides that if measures "have been or are proposed to
be taken by or under the law of any overseas country for regulating or controlling
international trade," and the measures "threaten to damage the trading interests
of the United Kingdom," the Secretary of State may prohibit compliance "with any
such requirement or prohibition . . . as he considers appropriate for avoiding dam-
age to the trading interests of the United Kingdom." Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.)
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3. The Effect on American-owned Foreign Subsidiaries
The existence of statutes such as the Cuban Democracy
Act and blocking statutes such as Canada's FEMA put Ameri-
can-owned foreign-based subsidiaries in a difficult legal posi-
tion. They either comply with United States law and possibly
violate the laws of their state of incorporation, or they obey the
state's laws and risk penalties from the United States. The
United States courts in the past have not been understanding
of the difficulties of the situation.'56 However, the Commerce
Department has been persuaded at certain times to "make an
exception" for a company, and it is conceivable that it will do
so again when a particular subsidiary in a particular country
is being greatly squeezed between two sets of laws.'57 In ad-
dition, the existence of laws such as the Cuban Democracy Act
makes it difficult for American-owned or controlled foreign
156. See Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982)
(a case arising out of the 1982 American embargo against the Soviet Union). Dres-
ser France, an American-owned French subsidiary, was ordered by the French
government to fulfill its contractual obligations concerning equipment bound for the
Soviet Union, and when Dresser France did so, it was fined by the United States.
Dresser was unsuccessful in its challenge of the suit. The court did not give
weight to the fact that Dresser France was ordered by the French government to
carry out its contract obligations with the Soviet Union. Id. The case was ulti-
mately dismissed when the embargo was lifted. Five other American-owned licens-
ees or subsidiaries located in West Germany, Italy, France, and the United King-
dom also had fines dismissed. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR
POLITICAL ENDS 296, 304 n.j (2d ed. 1983). For further discussion of the Dresser
case, see Moyer & Mabry, supra note 153, at 126-29. For the 1982 Soviet pipeline
embargo, see id. at 60-92.
157. Many times American-owned corporations have been caught between the
laws of two countries. In 1964, for example, the United States informed its domes-
tic corporation, Fruehauf, that its French subsidiary would violate the Foreign
Assets Control Regulations (31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1964)) if it fulfilled its contract to
ship tractor trailer parts to the People's Republic of China, a state then under
American embargo. Fruehauf, in order to avoid penalties, eventually instructed its
70%-owned subsidiary not to fulfill its contracts. However, the French Court of Ap-
peals, outraged at this interference with its commerce, appointed a judicial admin-
istrator to take control of the subsidiary to make sure the contracts were fulfilled,
finding that default would have endangered the subsidiary's existence. 5 I.L.M.
476 (1966) (summarizing Judgement of May 22, 1965 (Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy,
Cours d'appel [19651 2 La Gazette du Palais at 86 (Fr.)); see also supra note 18
concerning subsidiaries in Argentina and Canada that were caught between the
laws of their countries and United States law; supra note 115 and infra note 164
for the Netherlands-based subsidiary caught between American and Dutch law in
1982; supra note 156, regarding Dresser France, the American-owned subsidiary
caught between American and French law in 1982. For more discussion, see Thom-
pson, supra note 18, at 326-28.
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subsidiaries to compete on a fair plane with other companies,
in addition to the possibility of breaking laws established by
one or both countries claiming jurisdiction over them.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Amending the Cuban Democracy Act
Because the Cuban Democracy Act violates international
law principles and has been the cause of much rancor by other
nations, Congress should revoke the Act's application to for-
eign-based American subsidiaries. The revision can be justified
by the language of the Act itself, which allows for change in
American policy after there are changes in Cuba's policies.'58
Since the implementation of the Act in 1992, there have been
many changes in Cuba, made undoubtedly in response to the
embargo that, although not enough to end a complete embargo
by the Act's terms, are enough to allow for modifications. For
instance, investors are now allowed to own more than fifty
percent of joint ventures,159 United States currency has been
legalized, 6 ° travel restrictions by Cuban exiles have been
eased,' and a certain amount of private enterprise is now
allowed.'62
Congress should also modify the Act because, as it stands,
the United States has passed a law that does not accord with
the understandings of the majority of the international commu-
nity, and yet the world also knows that the United States will
158. "It should be the policy of the United States . .. to be prepared to reduce
the sanctions in carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in
Cuba." 22 U.S.C. § 6002(7) (Supp. IV 1988).
159. Andres Oppenheimer, Is Business Interest in Cuba Waning?, MIAMI HER-
ALD, July 22, 1993, at 18A.
160. Christopher Marquis, supra note 140.
161. Christopher Marquis, supra note 140.
162. Individuals may go into 117 categories of work, including plumbing, hair-
dressers, and clowns. Mimi Whitefield, Rapid Changes Push Cuba into Unknown,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 27, 1993, at IA.
In response to some of these measures, the Clinton administration was
reported to be preparing to allow more Americans to visit Cuba. Marjorie Miller,
U.S. Cuba Policy Undefined, But a Thawing of Relations is Evident, L.A. TIMES,
July 9, 1993, at 5. In recent months, there were signs that Washington had both
toned down its rhetoric and eased certain restrictions. See Ben Barber, supra note
27; Christopher Marquis, Stance on Cuba Changing, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug.
13, 1993, at A21; Christopher Marquis, U.S. Policy Toward Cuba is Softening
Despite Denials, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 12, 1993, at 1A.
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be unable to enforce the Act. A revision of the Act will stop the
possible mockery of the United States by the international
community. The Act does not reinforce the prestige of the Unit-
ed States when a corporation can disobey the United States
law and face no consequences. When a law is openly defied and
is difficult if not impossible to enforce, it makes the United
States look weak and foolish. An act with no "teeth" is only
international bluster without substance. Since Congress cannot
provide "teeth," due to the Act's violation of international juris-
dictional principles, it would do well to rewrite the Act so that
no bluster remains.
One thing that is clear is that within the United States,
the Cuban Democracy Act is not likely to be deemed unconsti-
tutional. Foreign policy decisions are accorded great deference
by the courts, and no court is likely to question a foreign policy
embargo currently in force.'63 Courts would be likely to con-
sider any question concerning the validity of an embargo as a
political question and not within the purview of the courts.'
163. See Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108, 110 (D.D.C.
1982) (foreign policy embargo against Soviet Union creates a "grave interest" in
enforcement; no interests of an individual company outweigh the "potentially seri-
ous detriment" to the undermining of the embargo).
164. The "political question" issue was discussed by the Supreme Court in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
While the Cuban Democracy Act will not be deemed unconstitutional in this
country, that does not mean that other nations will not be faced with cases aris-
ing out of the Act's implementation. For example, it appears likely that Canada
would fine an American-owned Canadian subsidiary if it were shown to have vio-
lated Canada's FEMA order against complying with the Cuban Democracy Act, See
supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
In addition, courts in other nations will potentially have to address United
States jurisdictional claims should an American foreign-based subsidiary be alleged
to have violated a nation's municipal law in order to comply with the Cuban De-
mocracy Act. Should that situation occur, the particular court will undoubtedly be
guided by the reasoning of The Hague's District Court in 1982 which had to deter-
mine whether a Netherlands-based American subsidiary was responsible for obey-
ing the American boycott against the Soviet Union. See Judgment of Sept. 17,
1982 (Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.), District
Court at the Hague, reproduced in 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983)); see also supra note 115.
In that case, the court held that the subsidiary was a national of the Netherlands
as it was "organized in the Netherlands under Netherlands law and both its regis-
tered office and its real centre of administration [were] located within the Nether-
lands." Id. at 71. The court examined international legal principles to determine
whether another principle of jurisdiction could give the United States authority to
assert jurisdiction over the subsidiary. While dismissing the universality principle
as being inapplicable in the situation, it questioned whether the protective princi-
ple could be applied, but held that "[sluch other State interests do not include the
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Therefore, foreign policy decisions must be addressed legisla-
tively.
165
B. Considerations for Congress
1. Education of Congress
First, in order to change the kind of extraterritorial legis-
lation that has appeared over the last twenty-five years, the
State Department must undertake a program to educate the
members of Congress concerning the important principles of
international law. If Congress is more cognizant of jurisdiction-
al principles, it can tailor its legislation accordingly.'66 While
there might be occasions when extraterritorial application of a
law is necessary,'67 at least the law will be more likely to be
foreign policy interest that the U.S. measure [the Soviet pipeline embargo] seeks
to protect" and that "[tihe protection principle cannot therefore be invoked." Id. at
72. It also dismissed the use of the effects doctrine, after finding that there was
no direct and illicit effects within the territory of the United States due to the
exporting to the Soviet Union of goods produced outside of the United States. Id.
at 72-73. The district court concluded that there was no international principle
sufficient to override the Netherlands territorial right to jurisdiction and that the
American-owned subsidiary was therefore to honor its contracts as a Netherlands
national. See supra note 115.
165. In the case of foreign trade embargoes, the EARs would have to be modi-
fied, along with explicit extraterritorial regulations such as the CACRs and the
Foreign Assets Control Regulations to eliminate their extraterritorial features.
166. A very real problem may be that lawmakers may not be aware of custom-
ary international law principles, or of their significance. Phillip R. Trimble, A
Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 730
(1986). For instance, the sponsor of the Cuban Democracy Act was quoted as say-
ing that every effort was made to make the Act non-extraterritorial. UN Votes
Against U.S. on Embargo of Cuba, supra note 133, at 1.
In addition, there exists a "lack of institutional memory," Barry E. Carter,
International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1262 (1987). This lack may account for the 1982 American
boycott of the Soviet Union (see supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text), in
which the members of the Reagan administration seemed unaware of the ramifi-
cations that grew out of earlier international confrontations with United States
allies over its imposition of extraterritorial controls concerning China and Cuba. In
the years following the Soviet embargo, other trade embargoes were more limited
in scope. Carter, supra, at 1262. However, ten years later, with the imposition of
the Cuban Democracy Act, there again seems to have been a certain amount of
collective memory loss. The State Department is perhaps in the best position to
both keep abreast and inform the legislature and Executive departments of inter-
national law principles.
167. There will be situations when the United States may be justified in exert-
ing extraterritorial control over a foreign subsidiary. First might be when the
subsidiary is only a middleman through which goods pass on their way to their
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grounded in principles that will mute criticisms from other
countries. Second, the members of Congress must also be
referred to the Restatement (Third)6 ' as a guide. The Restate-
ment (Third)'s test of "reasonableness," which requires balanc-
ing the varying interests of the states involved, helps to deter-
mine when extraterritorial jurisdiction is appropriate.'69 Ide-
ally, Congress should enact legislation that incorporates the
reasonableness test rather than making the courts determine
what is "reasonable" after the fact,7 ' or forcing ambassadori-
intended destination in a third country. Second is "when the subsidiary is deliber-
ately used to circumvent controls over exports from the United States." Third is
"when the subsidiary is manufacturing high technology strategic products based on
U.S. technology." In these situations, however, it would be important to follow the
dictates of comity and consult with the subsidiary's host government to establish
that the United States needs to retain some control. These suggestions all derive
from Tittmann, supra note 128, at 737.
168. The Restatement (Third) declares that a state may not normally regulate
activities of corporations organized under the laws of a foreign state simply be-
cause they are owned or controlled by nationals of the regulating state. If a deter-
mination were made that a major national interest exists that can only be carried
out effectively if it is applied to foreign-based subsidiaries as well as domestic
ones, the state would still have to assess the extent to which a conflict would
result with the law or policy of the subsidiary's domiciliary state. Weighing these
factors, it might be deemed appropriate to issue an essential regulation to further
the state's program. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 414(2)(a)-(c). However,
"orders issued directly to a foreign corporation are regarded as particularly intru-
sive and can be justified only by a clear showing of necessity . . . ." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 49, § 414 cmt. c. Furthermore, "[a] command by the parent
state may conflict with a clearly expressed policy of the state under whose law the
subsidiary is organized. If that state is also the state in whose territory the activi-
ty regulated is to be carried out or precluded, exercise of jurisdiction on the basis
of intercorporate affiliation may be unreasonable under § 403." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 49, § 414 cmt. d.
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 403. For the text of this section of
the Restatement (Third), see supra note 70.
170. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
948-50 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (complaining of the impossibility of balancing competing
state interests); see also Hixson, supra note 49, at 145 (noting that the Restate-
ment (Third) is limited in providing guidance to the judiciary and that many times
the resolution should be achieved through diplomatic, not judicial, means). In the
courts, the balancing test has often simply led to the conclusion that United
States interests are primary. For instance, in the area of antitrust litigation which
has often dealt with extraterritoriality, between 1909 and 1985 there was no re-
ported United States appellate court decision in which jurisdiction was found lack-
ing. Predictability and Comity, supra note 112, at 1324-25. This is an "extraordi-
nary lack of jurisdictional restraint" and suggests that balancing tests are not
useful. Predictability and Comity, supra note 112, at 1324-25. For the views of a
commentator who does not believe the American courts have been or will be inca-
pable of balancing items in the best interests of the matter before them, see Born,
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al representatives to smooth ruffled feathers. This balancing of
interests can be best accomplished at the rule-making
stage.'
2. Principles to be Incorporated into Future Legislation
Because the international community is growing closer
through technology and other means, the United States, as
well as other nations, must do what it can to avoid sources of
friction between nations. To the extent that the posture of the
United States is that it can legislate extraterritorially and with
impunity, it invites other nations to strike the same posture.
Furthermore, it will not ease international relations if coun-
tries begin to block every piece of legislation, because it is
extraterritorial, including acts that might be considered of
highest concern to the legislating nation. Nor will it be useful
if other states begin to employ extraterritorial legislation, par-
ticularly embargoes, in the same manner as the United
States. 72  Above all, in the international arena, United
States jurisdictional policy must be viewed as fair by other
nations. The United States should incorporate into its own
supra note 69, at 95-96.
171. See Hixson, supra note 49, at 144 (citing European Communities: Com-
ments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the U.S.S.R., 21 I.L.M. 891,
900 (1982)).
172. Already, Canada and some developing countries exercise limited jurisdic-
tion over foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises based in their countries.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 414, reporters' note 1. The European
Economic Community, for instance, employs the effects doctrine in the area of
antitrust. Its competition law is applied specifically to conduct carried on outside
the Community that has the effect of substantially restricting competition within
the Community. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC
TREATY], art. 85. This law allows the European Court of Justice to assume juris-
diction over a parent company incorporated in a non-Member State with a subsid-
iary in a Member State if that subsidiary "does not determine its behaviour on
the market in an autonomous manner but essentially carries out the instructions
of the parent company." SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 53, at 322-23 & n.26 (citing
EEC TREATY, arts. 85-90). Compare this with the United States, which applies its
laws extraterritorially with respect to antitrust, disclosure, tax law, and foreign
policy. Schachter, supra note 59, at 243-44.
When the United States faced an extraterritorially enforced embargo by the
Arab nations against Israel, begun in 1954 but only of real import in the middle
1970s, it suddenly found itself on the other end of the stick. "In this case many of
the arguments used by the U.S. Administration and in debates in Congress resem-
ble strangely those of other governments contesting the legality of U.S. extraterri-
torial measures." DE MESTRAL & GRUcHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 8, at 255.
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practice, and lobby for inclusion in the practice of other states,
the presumption that when a state undertakes to incorporate a
company within its territorial jurisdiction, it means to make
that corporation a national in the eyes of international law.
This would bring United States practice in line with the many
friendship and commerce treaties that explicitly state that
corporations are nationals of the state of their incorpora-
tion,'73 and with recent United States court decisions that
hold the same position."4
3. Future Use of Trade Embargoes
The policy expressed in the Cuban Democracy Act, to con-
trol corporations owned or controlled by United States nation-
als for foreign policy reasons, is not unique to the situation
with Cuba. More than any other country, the United States
regulates the trade of its nationals in order to influence or
punish countries. 5 When these regulations have applied to
subsidiaries incorporated abroad, it has usually resulted in
tension between the countries involved, sometimes leading to
diplomatic and legal problems. 6
Congress should limit the use of export controls for foreign
policy purposes. The imposition of embargoes causes foreign
nations to question whether United States corporations and
American-owned or controlled foreign subsidiaries are reliable
as suppliers of goods.' The use of trade sanctions entails a
sometimes heavy economic cost for the United States, includ-
ing costs that may be long-term.' The Cuban embargo, simi-
173. For discussion of these treaties, see supra note 89.
174. See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Title
VII applies to employees of a United States-based Japanese subsidiary); see also
Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the fact that
a German subsidiary was one hundred percent owned by General Motors did not,
in itself, allow the court to ignore the fact that the subsidiary was a separately
incorporated entity).
175. A study of foreign policy economic sanctions employed between 1945 and
1984 showed that the United States employed sanctions 62 times. There were 29
other embargoes: 12 by the United Kingdom, 10 by the Soviet Union, and 4 by
the Arab League. Carter, supra note 166, at 1170 (citing G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHO-
Tr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (1985)).
176. See supra note 157.
177. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 153, at 90.
178. The application of United States laws extraterritorially generates signifi-
cant competitive problems. "Subjecting U.S. companies to the often substantial
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lar to the 1982 Soviet pipeline embargo, has been deeply divi-
sive of the international community. It has damaged interna-
tional relations between the United States and many allies,
including those in Europe and South America, and has under-
mined the credibility and reliability of American foreign-based
subsidiaries.'79 The United States can reduce international
tension and increase its international stature if it appeals to
an international body such as the United Nations for its im-
primatur against a country's actions rather than proceeding
unilaterally. Indeed, in the case of Cuba, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed a "sense of Congress" that called on Presi-
dent Clinton to seek a mandatory international embargo
against Cuba at the United Nations Security Council. 8 ' A
reliance on the United Nations by the United States can only
strengthen the United States' position in the international
costs of compliance with U.S. law, while exempting their foreign rivals from such
costs, would have significant competitive effects." Born, supra note 69, at 91.
American multinationals such as Cargill, Continental Grain, Beatrice Foods, and
Del Monte have subsidiaries abroad that trade with Cuba and have been affected
by the embargo. Christopher Marquis, Cuba Bill to Cost U.S. Firms Millions, MI-
AMI HERALD, Aug. 6, 1992, at 22A. Among multinationals whose subsidiaries have
refused trade proposals with Cuba are H.J. Heinz Co. and Eli Lilly, Inc. Both
subsidiaries are located in Canada. Peter Benesh, supra note 152. These firms,
and many others, have been unable to take advantage of Cuba's active seeking of
foreign investments, particularly in sugar, tourism, textiles, tobacco,
pharmaceuticals, nickel, and shipping. CARIBBEAN 1993 BuSINESS DIRECTORY, supra
note 6, at 78
Foreign corporations will benefit from a United States embargo by being
able to enter a market formerly dominated by the United States. Indeed, despite
the United States embargo, Spain, France, Canada, Mexico, Chile, and Italy are
investing in Cuba, mainly in tourism. Ben Barber, supra note 27. The final result
is that United States trade and United States foreign subsidiaries are injured.
This has happened in the past. In 1973, the United States embargoed the export
of soy products. Its embargo allowed Brazil to become a major soybean producer
and diminished the world market share of United States producers. Other exam-
ples include the 1980 United States boycott of the Moscow Olympics boycott, in
which Argentina, Brazil, and the European Community replaced the United States
as the principal grain suppliers to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet pipeline em-
bargo in which Japan's Komatsu replaced Caterpillar as the principal supplier of
large machines to the Soviet market. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 153, at 159-60
& n.921.
179. For the impact on United States' international relations following the 1982
embargo, see Moyer & Mabry, supra note 153, at 159. For the international reac-
tion to the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act, see supra part IV.B.1.
180. Christopher Marquis, House Panel Endorses Global Cuban Embargo, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 23, 1993, at 24A. There has been no further action reported on the
matter.
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community.
VI. CONCLUSION
The extraterritorial features of the Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992 do not comply with the principles of international law
and will be difficult to enforce without further violating inter-
national principles of territorial sovereignty. For this reason
the Act should be modified so that foreign-based subsidiaries
are excluded from the provisions of the Act. The Act also raises
the question of the usefulness of economic trade bans applied
extraterritorially because they strain international relations,
hurt United States foreign-based companies, and harm the
credibility of the United States as a trading partner. In the
end, it may be that growing international pressure on the
United States to conform with international principles, along
with the need of the United States to maintain friendly rela-
tions with trading partners and with other countries, will lead
to a lessening of their use as a foreign policy weapon.
Julia P. Herd
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